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From the Dean)s Desk: 
The Class of '73 
On May 21, 1973, the Law School graduated the 
largest class in its history, with 212 students receiving 
the J.D. degree. It was also the most diverse class in 
history, with 21 women and 8 blacks among the gradu-
ates. Our classes will not grow larger in the future. 
They will probably number about 200, a norm much 
larger than the traditional size of only a few years ago, 
but smaller than the Class of 1973. However, the pro-
portion of women and minority group students is very 
likely to continue rising. As I write this message in 
early July, over 
90% of this 
year's graduates 
have jobs, and 
by September I 
expect this will 
be true of 100%. 
Most of our 
graduates enter 
private practice. 
Some do so after 
a year or two in 
judicial clerkships which attract about 20% of the 
graduating classes. Ten to twelve per cent of the 
young lawyers work in public interest and community 
service law firms. More would do so if the oppor-
tunities were available. Private firms in Philadelphia 
and New York continue to take large numbers of our 
graduates-49 so far this year, but the rest of the 
country has opened wide, with the west coast con-
tinuing to grow in popularity. It is a mark of our 
students' abilities and attractiveness and of the quality 
and reputation of their legal education that in a rela-
tively tight buyer's market, the Penn J.D. is in heavy 
demand. 
This year has seen the excitement of new curricular 
developments and new faculty. It has also witnessed 
growth in the development of student litigation, re-
search and service activities. These will be detailed in 
my Annual Report for 1972-73. Suffice it for now to 
note that the diversity and depth of legal education at 
Penn, the striving for excellence by faculty and stu-
dents, and their dedication to law and justice leave no 
room or justification for cynicism. Continuing inequali-
ties of opportunity, Watergate, a bankrupt criminal 
justice system-these are not excuses for despair. They 
are taken as challenges at Penn, as reasons for law 
and justice and for the education of people devoted to 
those goals. Watergate does not call for indictment of 
Law but for a recognition of the nation 's dependence 
on law and on lawyers, in and out of government, who 
are not above it. 
The School's relationships with its alumni have never 
been more fruitful or satisfying. The Law Board, the 
Alumni Society, The Order of Coif, these groups and 
others, and many, many individuals provide advice, 
program enrichment and encouragement to our stu-
dents and faculty. Later in the year I will report on the 
extraordinary achievements of the Development Steer-
ing Committee and the Annual Giving leadership. All 
of this bespeaks the harmony and commonality of 
purpose that bind alumni and School together and add 
unique strength to our educational enterprise by 
utilizing all the resources , intellectual and material, that 
able and dedicated lawyers make available. The School, 
and society as a whole, are the richer. 
lt was pleasant seeing so many of you here last May 
on Law Alumni Day. This is your School and we hope 
you will visit it as often as you can. 
Remember A. A. G. 
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Pennsylvania 
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Assistant District 
Attorney in 
Philadelphia 
and a partner in 
the firm of Katz 
and Rovner 
The issue of capital punishment has been one of the 
most continuous and fiercely debated in our history. 
Since 1846, several States, some 15 in number, have 
completely abolished capital punishment, and of these, 
11 have reinstated the death penalty. Of these 11, 3 
have reabolished capital punishment. At the moment, 
there are only 10 States of the 50 that have abolished 
the death penalty. Further evidence of the strong re-
surgence in support for capital punishment, is the ac-
tion of the United States House of Representatives in 
voting for the death penalty for aircraft hijacl<ings on 
October 2, 1972 by a margin of 354 to 2. 
On June 29, 1972, the United States Supreme 
Court ruled on the issue in the now famous decision in 
Furman v. Georgia. This decision has been widely 
misconstrued to hold that capital punishment was 
abolished for all purposes. This is not the case, as a 
reading of the decision will clearly show. 
The precise holding in Furman is, to say the least, 
difficult to state. Each of the nine Justices wrote a 
separate opinion, expressing a wide contrariety of 
views, spread over 233 pages of the United States 
Reports. There was no opinion for the Court. The 
per curiam order of reversal rested on the votes of five 
Justices-Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White and 
Marshall-each of whom wrote a concurring opinion 
in which none of their brethren joined. The four dis-
senting votes-cast by Chief Justice Warren Burger 
and Justices Blackman, Powell and Rehnquist-found 
no constitutional infirmity in the death penalty per se, 
or in the manner of its imposition in the cases before 
the Court. Three of the dissenting opinions, by the 
Chief Justice, and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, were 
joined by all four of the dissenting Justices. 
A detailed analysis of the nine opinions in Furman 
4 
Death Penalty: 
The 
Case-
For 
By Robert A. Rovner 
would unduly lengthen this article. However, I believe 
it would be useful , at this point to state very briefly 
what appears to be the principal thrusts of the key 
opinions, and the practical effect of the Furman deci-
sion from the standpoint of future legislative initiatives. 
Only two Justices, Brennan and Marshall, con-
cluded, on the basis of somewhat differing theories, 
that the death penalty is unconstitutional per se. Jus-
tices Stewart, White and Douglas based their concur-
rences on their conclusions that the statutes before the 
Court, in leaving the imposition of the death penalty to 
the unfettered discretion of the judge or jury, led to ar-
bitrary and discriminatory impositions of the penalty. 
Each of the latter three Justices made it clear that 
he was not reaching the question whether mandatory 
death penalty statutes would be invalid. The practical 
effect of Furman, therefore, appears to be to leave to the 
Congress and the State Legislatures some le~way to 
devise new statutory mechanisms for the imposition of 
the death penalty, provided such mechanisms restrict 
sentencing discretion and ensure increased rationality 
in patterns of death sentence imposition. This reading of 
Furman is supported by a detailed analysis of the deci-
sion, particularly by the following statement from 
Justice Burger's dissenting opinion-
definitive statement as to the parameters of 
the Court's ruling, it is clear that if state 
legislatures and the Congress wish to main-
tain the availability of capital punishment, 
significant statutory changes will have to be 
made. Since the two pivotal concurring opin-
ions [Justices Stewart and White] turn on the 
assumption that the punishment of death is 
now meted out in a random and unpredict-
(Continued on page 16) 
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Death Penalty: 
The 
Case 
Against 
By Fred Speaker 
Once again we turn to the bloody business of sav-
age murder and violent retribution. 
Again this year, as in virtually every one of the 
past three hundred years of Pennsylvania history, the 
debate about the Death Penalty has wracked and di-
vided this Commonwealth. 
Almost a year ago the Supreme Court of the United 
States spoke what could have been the ultimate words 
in the dispute. The full Court, examining death de-
crees in murder and rape cases, held that: 
... the imposition and carrying out of the 
death penalty in these cases constitutes cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.l 
The Supreme Court specifically extended this hold-
ing2 to the Pennsylvania Death Penalty statute; but the 
several proposals for restoration now before the Gen-
eral Assembly demonstrate, sadly, that the issue has 
not yet been laid to rest. 
The Death Penalty should be kept from Pennsylva-
nia. It can not be made constitutional. Even if it could, 
we should let others follow that gory course and turn 
our attention to ways to protect and promote human 
life. 
Deterrence-
The proponents of the Death Penalty have advanced 
various arguments in its support. Some see a Biblical 
imperative. Others seek vengeance. Some argue that 
it is the ultimate weapon against recividism-or is a 
device to force guilty pleas. But it is the claim that the 
Death Penalty is a deterrent that is the basis for most 
of the support. 
Does the Death Penalty deter crime? There is 
no solid evidence that it does. As the United Nations 
study ~ of the effect of the Death Penalty world-wide 
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and a partner in 
the firm of 
Pepper, 
Hamilton & 
Scheetz 
has shown, there is no statistical evidence that estab-
lishes the existence of a deterrence when compared to 
the deterrent effect of a life sentence. 
History presents some strong arguments against the 
belief that executions deter. Capital crimes proliferated 
when executions were common. When pickpockets 
were publicly hanged in England, it was not safe to 
be in the crowd because there were so many pick-
pockets at work. We even read recent FBI reports that 
show murder of police officers decreased in the half 
year after the Supreme Court outlawed the Death 
Penalty. 
This history is not cited to show that the electric 
chair or the gas chamber encourages murder-al-
though some make that claim. 4 It is cited to show 
the impossibility of proving that it prevents murder. 
Yet the burden of proof must be on those who 
would deliberately take life in order to protect life. It 
is the terrible burden of those who argue that it is a 
deterrent to prove their case-a burden not yet shoul-
dered and impossible of carrying. 
Some argue that deterrence defies statistical proof 
-but can be established by human experience or by 
logic. But for every isolated interview cited-where a 
felon claims he didn't carry a weapon because he 
feared the chair-there can be cited the case of a 
psychotic or an exhibitionist5 incited by the Death 
Penalty to kill. 
Similarly, logic fails. Surely, if the Death Penalty 
deterred murder, when capital punishment was still 
imposed there would have been more killing in states 
relying solely on life imprisonment than in capital 
punishment states. It didn't happen. 6 If the logic held, 
the rate of murder would have increased after a state 
(Continued on page 18) 
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A Case 
Screening 
Innovation: 
A.R.D. 
By Arlen Specter 
The courtroom scene is strikingly different. The 
judge, defendant, district attorney and defense lawyer 
sit around a small conference table. The judge can be 
identified from the introductions but not from his at-
tire-he wears a business suit instead of a robe. 
The defendant sits close enough to reach over and 
grab the judge if he is unhappy with the result. But he 
does not, because he has reason to be pleased with what 
goes on there. And so do the police, the district attorney, 
the court system and the public. 
The approach is as unique as the furniture arrange-
ment. There is no interest in punishment or even in 
determining guilt. Rather, the concern is to save the 
defendant from the criminal justice system and to save 
the system itself by saving the time and talents of the 
police, the prosecutor and the judiciary. 
The Anglo-Saxon criminal justice system has lum-
bered along for centuries, adding many new laws-
many of which are now unenforceable-and many new 
procedures-many of which are now obsolete. Even 
II Levin Takes Post II 
Professor A. Leo Levin has been appointed Exec-
utive Director of the National Commission on Revi-
sion of the Federal Court Appellate System. The 
Commission, created by Congress last fall, has 16 
members, 4 appointed by the President, 4 by the Chief 
Justice of the United States, 4 by the Speaker of the 
House of Representatives, and 4 by the President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate. The Commission's purpose is 
two-fold: 
(a) to study the present division of the United 
States into the several judicial circuits and to report 
(Continued on page 30) 
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Arlen Specter: 
District Attorney 
of Philadelphia 
to the President, the Congress, and the Chief Justice 
those who labor daily within the system often can not 
agree on its objectives, but virtually everyone agrees 
that the system does not work. 
The criminal courts are clogged with the prosecu-
tion of lesser offenses. With limited numbers of judges, 
courtrooms and supporting personnel, the rapes, rob-
beries and killings should receive priority attention. 
And we know that the defendant, who gets caught 
in the revolving door of criminal justice, is likely to 
move up the ladder ·of serious crimes if he cannot be 
pulled out of the cycle at an early stage. 
These were some of the reasons that led us early in 
1971 to experiment in Philadelphia with a new pro-
gram which was then called Pre-Indictment Probation, 
but which now shoulders the unwieldy title of Ac-
celerated Rehabilitative Disposition. 
After Pennsylvania Superior Court Judge J. Sidney 
Hoffman and the Philadelphia District Attorney's Of-
fice formulated the program, Judge Hoffman presented 
the proposal to his Court which unanimously approved 
it as conceived. At the same time, the District Attor-
ney's Office discussed the proposal in a series of meet-
ings with the Justices of the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court and leading representatives of the Philadelphia 
and Pennsylvania Bar. 
Late in the Fall of 1970, Judge Hoffman and I made 
a formal request that the Supreme Court permit such 
an experimental program and on January 7, 1971, the 
Supreme Court entered an order authorizing the in-
stitution of such a program and the assignment of 
Judge Hoffman to that program, both for a period of 
six months. On January 21, 1971, the new program 
was publicly announced. 
The program was designed primarily for first of-
(Continued on page 22) 
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Louis H. Pollak: 
Former Dean of 
the Yale Law 
School 
My task-my very happy task-is to congratulate 
you on your achievements-achievements which augur 
well for the future-and to welcome you into the 
sorority/ fraternity of Coif and (subject to further ex-
amination) of the bar.* It is a task for which, though 
I stand here cloaked with apparent authority, I in fact 
lack the proper credentials. And, given the importance 
which attaches these days to full public disclosure, I 
will make my disclaimers patent at the outset. Al-
though I count myself a lawyer, I don't know that I 
can so describe myself in this company; First, there 
is the fact that I am not a member of the bar of this 
Commonwealth . I am admitted to the bar in New 
York and in Connecticut, but I understand that sub 
specie aeternitatis-which, roughly translated, means 
in the view of Philadelphia lawyers-each of these is 
a lesser bar, without the law. Of course I hope that 
some day I can be permitted to repair the deficiency 
and be admitted here in Pennsylvania; and I have 
been assured by Dean Wolfman and other leaders of 
the Pennsylvania bar that they will be glad to assist 
me in the endeavor insofar as it can be accomplished 
without prejudice to the professional standards pre-
vailing in this jurisdiction. My graver disability-one 
which even Dean Wolfman and Bernard Segal together 
are powerless to remedy-is that I am not a member 
of Coif. As to this, I can only throw myself on the 
mercy of the court. For whatever good it may do, I 
will cite you a modest, and possibly applicable, prece-
dent: In 1948, at the annual banquet of a magazine 
which will remain anonymous but which, for the pur-
pose of cloaking its identity, I will denominate the 
*Address at the Annual Meeting of the University of Penn-
sylvania Chapter of Coif, 11 June 1973. 
Summer 1973 
Coif: 
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Yale Law Journal, the toastmaster was one Thurman 
Arnold. He expressed his pleasure at being called into 
service by the editors of the Journal, but he expressed 
reservations as to the appropriateness of his selection. 
He recalled to his audience a somewhat earlier occa-
sion when he and Chief Justice Stone were speakers 
at a banquet of a magazine which must remain anony-
mous but which, for the purpose of cloaking its iden-
tity, I will denominate the Harvard Law Review. The 
Chief Justice, so reported Thurman Arnold, devoted 
much of his speech to a discourse on the educational 
values accruing from work as an editor of a law re-
view. "'I am sure,' said the Chief Justice, "that Judge 
Arnold will agree with me that the hours of his student 
career which were most beneficial were those he de-
voted to the work of the Review'." And, so Arnold 
recalled, "when the Chief Justice said in no uncertain 
terms, 'I am sure Judge Arnold will agree,' I found I 
(Continued on page 25) 
II Ruth &. Co. To D.c. II 
Henry S. Ruth, Jr., '55, has been appointed Deputy 
Special Prosecutor in the Watergate affair-the Num-
ber 2 man-appointed to the position by the Special 
Prosecutor, Archibald Cox. Ruth was a member of 
the Law School Faculty from 1967-69. 
Joseph J. Connolly, '65, has also been appointed 
to the legal staff of the Watergate Special Prosecution 
Unit. He served in the Solicitor General's office from 
1968 to 1970, among other federal appointments, and 
was most recently a member of the Philadelphia firm 
of Ewing and Cohen. 
Ruth, 42, will help formulate strategy for the wide 
(Continued on page 30) 
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Is A 
College 
Degree 
A Must? 
By William R. Powell 
Is a college degree really necessary? Does it deserve 
its station as a virtual exception-free prerequisite to 
entry into the worlds of business and finance-not 
to mention the higher ranges of academe-the gradu-
ate and professional schools? 
What is sacred about a BA or a BS? Are they 
worth 4 years and $5,000 to $20,000? 
Do they really distinguish the talented from the 
talentless or the less talented? Isn't experience worth 
anything or if it is, how much? Can it be the equal 
of four years in a diploma mill? 
And if experience is underrated who are the 
losers? Is it just the diploma-less young men or women 
with their four or five years of on the job training 
in the real world-or is it employers as well? 
These are just a few of the questions which more 
and more businessmen and professional leaders are 
asking. 
What follows are one man's thoughts on the subject. 
What is wrong with the current college/ work 
cycle? 
Why are we selling college to America's youth as a 
launching pad for the things which are commonly 
known as the "good life"? Why do we package and 
advertise college as THE means of getting better jobs? 
And finally, why are we doing these things at the same 
time that graduates of Harvard University and MIT 
are forced to take jobs as taxi drivers on the streets 
of Boston? 
Don't panic gentlemen and women of the bar. I do 
not wish to take issue with the assumptions made 
about the benefits of orthodox education. I know what 
your LL.B.'s and J.D.'s mean to you. I want only, by 
this article, to take a close look at what I perceive 
to be orthodox education's greatest shortcoming-the 
all purpose four year, degree granting factory, aimed 
at the so-called college age population, and almost 
universally accepted by all as the stepping stone to 
those "better" jobs. 
Perhaps the initial point of this discussion should 
be the rethinking of our entire premise of American 
life and that of the American educational system. That 
is the premise that all college graduates are guaranteed 
"better" jobs. 
Most young adults have been propagandized into 
believing that a college degree is a necessary and per-
haps even a sufficient precondition for success. 
The problem with this thinking is simple : the econ-
omy is not geared to guaranteeing these presumptive 
better jobs. Also the American educational system is 
also not geared to train for such jobs. 
The ethics of pressuring our young into college when 
our system is not ready for them upon graduation is 
very questionable, if not patent fraud. 
What we have done, in effect, is create two types 
of employment : the "better" jobs reserved for the col-
lege graduate, who more times than not may not be 
as qualified for a specific job as the non-degree gradu-
ate, and the lesser grade jobs, the so-called "back-up" 
personnel automatically translated "low-level." 
What we are doing is destroying the vitality and 
spirit of our young people. We are forcing them into 
college, denying them an option, indeed limiting their 
perspectives. 
Professor Blanche D. Blank of Hunter College in a 
recent article in the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors Bulletin proposes a solution to this di-
lemma. Ban the college degree as a prerequisite to 
employment. Outlaw employment discrimination based 
on college degrees much the same as discrimination by 
sex, age, race, religion, or national origin has been 
outlawed. 
While on the surface Professor Blank's solution may 
seem somewhat radical , a careful analysis of the facts 
indicates that the plan may have merit. 
(Continued on page 28) 
II New Ombudsman 
Professor James 0 . Freedman has been appointed 
ombudsman of the University for a two-year term 
effective July 1, 1973. 
As ombudsman, Freedman will provide assistance 
to members of the University who have not been able 
to secure satisfactory resolutions to problems and mis-
understandings through normal University procedures. 
Investigations by the ombudsman will proceed from 
specific complaints by students, faculty or staff, and will 
not be initiated unilaterally by the ombudsman. 
Dr. Joel 0. Conarroe, associate professor of Eng-
lish, was appointed the University's first ombudsman 
(Continued on page 31) 
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Sharon 
Wallis, '67: 
Chairwoman of 
the Philadelphia 
Women's 
Political Caucus 
Sharon Wallis, who was graduated from the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania's School of Law in 1967, is not 
a typical lawyer. 
She lives in a warehouse, is married to a sculptor 
and seldom gets dressed in anything fancier than jeans. 
More importantly, few 29-year-old lawyers have the 
string of activities and successes that she has had. 
First, she is chairwoman of the Philadelphia Wom-
en's Political Caucus, a Democratic committeewoman 
in her ward, and chairwoman of the Philadelphia Bar 
Association's Consumer Protection Agency. 
She is also on the governing board of the Employ-
ment Discrimination Referral Project of the Philadel-
phia Bar Association and the Lawyers Committee, is 
active in the North Philadelphia Tenants Union and is 
treasurer of the Law Alumni Society of the University 
of Pennsylvania. 
She has also filed and argued a case which resulted 
Jones Selected II 
Frank N. Jones, a lawyer born in Clarksdale, 
Mississippi , has been appointed Vice-Dean of the Law 
School. Jones will assume this senior administrative 
post on August 1, 1973. 
Since September, 1971, Jones has served as Exec-
utive Director of the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association. Born in 1933, he has his LL.B. 
from De Paul University College of Law and his 
LL.M. from New York University School of Law 
where he was an Arthur Garfield Hays Fellow. 
Prior to joining the National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association, Jones was Deputy Associate 
(Continued on page 32) 
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in a landmark decision by a Federal District Court, is 
acttve in her own law firm (Temin, Wallis and Cohen, 
which specializes in women's nghts cases), and in her 
spare time manages to teach a women's rights course 
at the University of Pennsylvania and a poverty law 
course at Temple University's School of Law. 
Also, she is modest enough that she can recite all 
of these activities without even a hint of bragging. 
Ms. Wallis, who obviously thrives on activtty, is an 
advocate of the women's movement, and is excited 
about the prospect of more and more women getting 
involved, particularly in politics. 
'The motivation is developing now-the indicator 
is the number of women who are going to law school 
now," she said. 
"The best thing is for women to prepare themselves 
for leadership roles and an excellent way of doing this 
is by going to law school. 
'The goal is greater involvement of women in poli-
tics in a leadership role-and law school is a great way 
to get training." 
Ms. Wallis is already involved in politics. Last year, 
in addition to being a Democratic committeewoman, 
she was involved in challenging the delegations to the 
Democratic national convention. 
"Rules require the participation of women, youth, 
and minorities in the slating process. The selection 
process was supposed to be open, but there were not 
enough women in on it. The way it worked, not every-
one could file. You had to have the candidate's ap-
proval. 
"The process should be open to the public at large. 
We challenged on that basis." 
Tall, with long thick brown hair, and wearing jeans, 
boots, a shirt and no make-up, Ms. Wallis doesn't 
(Continued on page 30) 
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Service Award 
Recipient: 
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Summer 1973 
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Luongo 
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Hon. Theodore 
0 . Rogers 
Panelist: 
Hon. Ruggero J. 
Aldisert 
Law Alumni Day 
The annual Law Alumni Day, held on May 4th, 
was highlighted by a lively discussion of the pro-
posed federal rules of evidence and dinner and cocktails 
at the University Museum. 
The dinner was keynoted by the Hon. Joseph S. 
Lord, III, the chief Judge of the U.S. District Court for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and was followed 
by a private screening of the film "Scorpio" at the 
Duke Theater in C~nter City. 
The festivities began with a noon luncheon honoring 
the Classes of '08, '13, '23, '28, '33, '38, '43, '48, '53, 
(Continued on page 33) 
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Registration: 
Alumni 
check in 
Dinner 
Conversation: 
At the University 
Museum 
Panel 
Moderator: 
Professor A. 
Leo Levin 
Dean Wolfman: 
Flanked by 
Professor 
Schulhofer and 
Alumni Society 
President 
Joseph P. 
Flanagan, Jr. 
L 
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Former 
Pennsylvania 
Chief Justice: 
John C. Bell, 
Jr., with 
Flanagan and 
Alumni Day 
chairman 
Edwin P. Rome 
Summer 1973 
Panelists and 
Moderator: 
Rogers, Levin, 
Aldisert and 
Luongo 
Class of '08: 
Leon Obermayer 
and spouse 
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Class President: 
Peter Nelson 
addresses the 
graduates 
14 
Commencement 
Dais: Another 
view 
Graduates: 
Assembled in 
the courtyard 
Commencement 
Charles R. Halpern, Esq., founder and first director 
of the Center for Law and Social Policy, became an 
honorary fellow of the Law School at the annual 
commencement exercises on May 21. 
The ceremonies, held in the Law School Courtyard, 
were also marked by the presentation of a model 
of the Hsieh-Chai to vice dean James Strazzella, who 
was leaving the Law School. 
In his presentation to Mr. Halpern, Dean Bernard 
Wolfman noted that Halpern's "career at the Bar has 
shown how much the dedicated lawyer can accom-
plish when he has the will and imagination to move 
beyond the time-worn grooves of conventional prac-
tice and to cut new channels through which the rights 
and interests of the under-represented may find 
(Continued on page 16) 
LAW ALUMNI JOURNAL 
14
Penn Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 3 [2014], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/plj/vol8/iss3/1
Dean Wolfman: 
Congratulates 
Halpern 
Summer 1973 
Former Vice 
Dean: James 
Strazzella with 
Dean Wolfman 
Honorary 
Fellow: Charles 
R. Halpern 
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Commencement 
(Continued from page 14) 
expression." 
Not only has Halpern's work with the Center for 
Law and Social Policy produced significant changes 
in protection of the environment, protection of the 
unorganized consumer, and protection of those insti-
tutionalized because of mental illness or retardation, 
the Dean said, but it has also had a "notable influence 
on legal education." 
"That 
program," 
Dean Wolfman said, "was among 
the first to provide law students with an opportunity 
to participate directly in the conduct of challenging 
litigation and to learn from the experience which 
comes from actual exposure to the operations of the 
legal system." 
Among the awards presented to graduating students 
were the Oscar Milton Davis Prize to Joseph H. 
Wolfe, Jr., as the student who obtained the highest 
grades for the third year; The Dean Jefferson B. 
Fordham Human Rights Award to Jonathan L. F. 
Silver, as the student who made the most outstanding 
contribution to the advancement of individual freedom 
and dignity; The Bureau of National Affairs Award, 
to Dennis J. Braithwaite as the student who made the 
most satisfactory progress in the third year; and The 
Wiley C. Rutledge Memorial Award to Franklin J. 
Hickman and Marjorie A. Silver for studies on law 
enforcement and individual rights. 
Peter C. Nelson, president of the class of 1973, 
addressed the graduates and their guests. 
II Letters 
To THE EDITOR: 
Marianne Durso defended what is, indefensible, and 
has analogized with the past, what is, not analogous, 
the graffiti of the present. 
She has turned words inside out and upside down 
by stating present day graffiti "is the silent majority 
speaking out about themselves and their society." As 
I understand the "code word"-the silent majority-
it represents the white, affluent, conservative, middle 
and working class, the overwhelming majority of whom 
have done everything possible to distance themselves 
from those primarily engaged in modern day graffiti: 
the urban ghetto black teenager. 
While American urban graffiti may be, in part, a 
means of human communication, it is true that it is 
"the sign of a thinking people ... the sign of a feeling 
people ... "? Maybe so. Maybe also, it is what it 
appears to be: a wanton, willful, and malicious act of 
aggressive hostility towards others. These feelings, 
while explainable in terms of adolescent hostility, past 
16 
deprivation, and present degradation, appear more 
reasonable and to the point, than those expressed by 
Ms. Durso. 
The graffiti of the present conveys no message, tells 
no story, and expresses no communication, other than 
an effort to mark, scrawl, deface, and mutilate. No-
where else in the Western World, from London, Eng-
land, to Sydney, Australia, have there been similar 
markings in modern times. Their absence has not 
been noted with dismay. 
Ms. Durso asserts that those responsible for graffiti 
are "people (who) want to prove that they do exist 
in this rat race of a world. Perhaps if we read these 
'signs of the times' we could read the people of our 
society, their wants, their needs, and their hopes." 
Perhaps. Perhaps also, all our needs and hopes would 
have been better served if their needs and hopes had 
not resulted in these unfortunate expressions of 
human communication. 
The "times" would have been better served without 
these "signs." 
Edward L. Snitzer, '55 
Rovner 
(Continued from page 4) 
able manner, iegislative bodies may seek to 
bring their laws into compliance with the 
Court's ruling by providing standards for 
juries and judges to follow in determining 
the sentence in capital cases or by more 
narrowly defining the crimes for which the 
penalty is to be imposed." 
" ... legislative bodies have been given the 
opportunity, and indeed unavoidable respon-
sibility, to make a thorough re-evaluation of 
the entire subject of capital punishment." 
Under Furman, there are essentially three possible 
legislative approaches to the reinstatement of the death 
penalty-( 1) require imposition of the death penalty 
as an automatic consequence of conviction for the 
offense; (2) provide criteria for the discretionary 
imposition of the penalty; or ( 3) a combination of 
these approaches. 
While strict mandatory death penalties, as they 
were administered under the old common law, might 
be considered valid under a technical reading of the 
decision, it is uncertain whether they would survive 
constitutional a,ttack. Chief Justice Burger in his dis-
senting opinion condemned such an approach in these 
terms-
" If this [strict mandatory penalties] is the 
only alternative that the legislatures can 
safely pursue under today's ruling, I would 
have preferred that the Court opt for total 
abolition." 
Common law mandatory death penalties are highly 
objectionable on many grounds. In addition to human-
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itarian considerations, experience has proven that 
what is referred to as "jury nullification" takes place 
under such common law penalties. This is where 
juries simply refuse to convict regardless of the evi-
dence when they consider death an unwarranted pen-
alty in a particular case. 
At the other end of the permissible legislative spec-
trum under Furman is the approach of providing 
criteria to guide the discretionary imposition of the 
death sentence. And by applying that discretion on 
a state-wide level to remove the possibility of discrim-
ination on a local level. 
This is essentially the approach adopted by the 
American Law Institute in the Model Penal Code. 
The circumstances of aggravation and mitigation se-
lected by the draftsmen of the Model Penal Code 
were not intended to be exclusive. The Code provides 
that the sentencing authority [review boards included] 
should take into account the aggravating and miti-
gating circumstances enumerated . . . and any other 
facts it deems relevant," and that the Court should 
so instruct the jury when the issue is submitted to 
a jury. 
This leads me to a discussion of the capital punish-
ment issue as it directly affects the citizens of the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. As a member of the 
Senate Judiciary Committe, I see the issue of capital 
punishment under consideration by our committee in 
the form of many bills representing many philoso-
phies. Last year, only a matter of days after the 
Furman decision was handed down, Philadelphia Dis-
trict Attorney Arlen Specter wrote to all members of 
the State Legislature proposing a carefully drawn bill 
which would reinstitute capital punishment consistent 
with the guidelines imposed by the decision. 
The bill which was written by Specter provides for 
a mandatory death sentence for eight specific classes 
of murder and provides for automatic review of a 
conviction by the Board of Pardons which will be 
provided with a set of aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances to consider in their review. 
When I introduced the Specter Bill in the Senate 
a similar version was introduced in the State House 
of Representatives by Representative Harry Comer 
of Philadelphia. 
Although the bill easily passed the House by a 
vote of 157 to 38 on September 27th, the Senate did 
not act before the 1972 session ended and so I rein-
troduced the bill in the current session of the State 
Senate this past January. 
In this session the bill is being co-sponsored by 18 
of my colleagues. 
Recently a death penalty bill was passed by the 
House of Representatives by the overwhelming margin 
of 172-20. That bill is presently in the Senate Ju-
diciary Committee which is chaired by State Senator 
Louis G. Hill of Philadelphia. The Judiciary Com-
mittee Chairman has already indicated that he will not 
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permit a aeath penalty bill to reach the floor of the 
Senate until Governor Milton Shapp's Capital Punish-
ment Study Commission has published its report. This 
is expected to happen in early September. 
Even then the road to final passage will not be 
easy. Governor Shapp is vehemently opposed to the 
bill and has vowed that there will be no executions 
of convicted and sentenced criminals-however hei-
nous and depraved their crimes-while he is Governor 
of the Commonwealth. 
While the legislature debates the overall issue of 
capital punishment, I have introduced a bill which 
would call for a referendum on the issue at the Gen-
eral Election to be held next November. I firmly be-
lieve that the issue of reinstitution of the death penalty 
is properly one to be determined by democratic pro-
cess. Senator Hill once again blocks it's passage. 
Faced with the brutal and senseless killings of the 
warden and deputy warden of Philadelphia's Holmes-
burg Prison it is clear to me that we must strengthen 
our efforts to reinstitute capital punishment. Even the 
outrageous position of Governor Shapp appeared to 
be weakening. But reacting to the passage of capital 
punishment legislation in the House the Shapp pendu-
lum swung back again and he repeated his position 
against the legislation. 
The battle over reinstitution is not peculiar to Penn-
sylvania. Thus far fifteen states have reinstated the 
death penalty for murder, while three of those states, 
Arkansas, Georgia and Florida provide death sen-
tences for other crimes as well. 
Law enforcement officers throughout the United 
States have taken steps to support reinstitution of the 
death penalty. 
The National Association of Attorneys General at 
its December, 1972 meeting voted 32 to 2 to work for 
capital punishment legislation. And the Attorneys 
General have rated as excellent the chances of con-
stitutional success that mandatory death sentences 
would have in the following instances: 1. murder of 
a police officer, corrections employee or fireman act-
ing in the line of duty; 2. murder by a hired killer; 
3. murder by malicious use or detonation of any bomb 
or similar device; 4. murder by a person convicted 
previously of murder; 5. murder by a person under 
life imprisonment; 6. murder committed in the perpe-
tration of a felony when the perpetrator had previously 
been convicted of a felony; 7. murder resulting from 
the hijacking of a public vehicle; 8. multiple slayings; 
9. murder to prevent arrest or escape from legal cus-
tody; and 10. murder of a public official (assassina-
tion). 
The Specter bill, as I stated previously calls for a 
mandatory death sentence for eight classes of crime, 
seven of which are contained in the proposals em-
braced by the NAAG above. The eight classes are: 
1. The murder of a peace officer or fireman in the 
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line of duty. 
2. A contract murder committed for pecuniary 
gain. 
3. An assassination. 
4. A murder committed by a defendant previously 
convicted of first degree murder. 
5. A murder committed by a defendant serving 
a life sentence. 
6. A murder committed during a felony where the 
defendant had been previously convicted of a 
felony. 
7. A murder during a kidnapping. 
8. A murder resulting from a hijacking of a public 
vehicle. 
As I previously stated such a conviction would 
automatically be subject to review by the Board of 
Pardons. This Board would have the authority, by a 
majority vote, to reduce the sentence to life im-
prisonment after consideration of specific aggravating 
and mitigating circumstances. 
I feel that these provisions give the Specter Bill the 
uniform application across the state which the Furman 
decision demands. 
Why do I feel so strongly that capital punishment 
must be reinstated? 
My experience as a former assistant district attor-
ney, as a trial lawyer and as a legislator strongly sug-
gests that criminals are deterred by the threat of the 
death penalty. 
Too many times while I was a prosecutor hardened 
criminals openly admitted to me or my fellow prose-
cutors that they don't carry weapons because of their 
fear of the death penalty. 
Nowhere was this dramatized more clearly than 
in the Brooklyn Chase Manhattan Bank holdup of 
August 1972. The holdup man, while holding eight 
hostages in the bank for many, many hours, told a re-
porter that if the cops stormed the bank, "I could kill. 
I will shoot everyone in the bank. The Supreme Court 
will let me get away with this. There's no death pen-
alty. It is ridiculous. I can shoot everyone here then 
throw my gun down and you can't put me in the 
electric chair." 
This is positive proof that the penalty, or lack 
thereof, was very much on the mind of one armed 
criminal, a potential killer. It is unreasonable to con-
tend that the death penalty does not enter the minds 
of some other killers. It is unrealistic to contend that 
the death penalty does not, therefore, deter some 
criminals. 
I recognize very well that .the statistics of rising 
crime and of increased violent crime rates do not 
prove, with absolute certitude, that capital punish-
ment is a deterrent to murder. Likewise, I would dis-
pute the claim of the abolitionists that statistics prove 
their positions. 
I do submit that it is impossible to produce statis-
tics that show the number of crimes which were not 
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committed because of deterrent effect. Because we 
have not as yet and most certainly never will have 
criminals or potential criminals reporting to authori-
ties the reasons that they did not commit a certain 
crime. 
1 strongly urge, if one potential murderer is deterred 
annually and one innocent life spared, it justifies capi-
tal punishment. 
I submit that past and future victims of crime are 
deserving of our consideration, especially in view of 
the fact that, beyond any question, our racial minori-
ties and ghetto-dwellers are the principal victims of 
violent crimes, including those crimes for which the 
death penalty is provided. 
I believe that many of those who advocate the abo-
lition of the death penalty evidence a highly unrealis-
tic and lofty disregard for the plight of the actual vic-
tims of countless murders and the safety of the poten-
tial victims of those who will kill in the future. 
I believe that it is imperative that the death penalty 
be returned to law enforcement as a deterrent tool, not 
because I hold in low regard the life of any individual. 
I introduced this legislation because I hold human life 
in the highest regard and because I want the prosecu-
tors to have, at their disposal, every tool to protect the 
lives of decent, law abiding citizens. 
I firmly believe that the death penalty is a deterrent 
to crime. I hope that you will agree with me and urge 
your legislators to vote for the passage of this proposal. 
Speaker 
(Continued from page 5) 
abolished the Death Penalty. It didn't happen. 7 If de-
terrence were effective, there would be more killings 
of guards by lifers in abolitionist states. That didn't 
happen either. s 
If there were mysterious, uncounted, unidentifiable 
would-be killers held back from striking because they 
feared the chair-proof of their existence would have 
shown up in the studies. They didn't show because 
they didn't exist. So those who argue deterrence-now 
with the heavy burden of proof placed on them--can 
neither support their burden nor explain the evidence 
directly against them. 
How can we allow the return of a primitive prac-
tice that so demeans us all on such a flimsy basis as 
discredited logic or a handful of unverified subjective 
reports? 
The Constitution-
The effect of the action of the United States Su-
preme Court last year was to shift the burden of proof 
to the advocates of the Death Penalty. The result of 
the Court's decisions was to render unconstitutional 
every statute allowing a discretionary death sentence 
to be imposed. This is the clear import of the Furman 
case. There were nine separate opinions written-one 
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by each member of the Court. But, although each of 
the five majority opinions differed in breadth and in 
scope, all five Justices are in solid agreement that dis-
cretionary death penalties are unconstitutional. n 
The Supreme Court's order list, issued contempo-
raneously with the Furman decision, establishes be-
yond dispute that the discretionary death penalty has 
been eliminated. In a single day, the Court summarily 
vacated death sentences based on some 26 state sta-
tutes, including Pennsylvania's, involving 117 addi-
tional felons.l o 
Thus, no matter how the death sentence was deter-
mined, if it involved the exercise of discretion, the 
United States Supreme Court found it to be offensive 
to the Constitution, and overturned it. Whether death 
sentencing was dependent upon the discretion of judge 
or jury, and without regard to the form of the statutes 
conferring such discretion, the Court rejected it.l 1 
And the Court in its present term consistently con-
tinues this practice and vacates any such death 
sentences.1 2 
Despite the plea that particular crimes were so atro-
cious as to specially merit execution of the convict, 
the Court's treatment of these cases recognized no dif-
ferences in the reach and effect of the Eighth Amend-
ment. The nature of the offenses or the particular 
circumstances of the cases were not significant in the 
context of the prohibition of cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. Many of the 120 defendants whose death 
sentences were vacated had been convicted of excep-
tionally brutal murders , J :: felony-murders, 14 mass 
murders, 1 " as well as cases involving the murder of 
law enforcement officers,16 
With this background of wholesale judicial disap-
proval of existing death penalty provisions, some pro-
ponents have nonetheless sought to construct a sta-
tute impervious to constitutional attack. Although the 
exact dimensions of the legislative proposals are pres-
ently unclear, their general form is predictable. Basic-
ally, they will call for a mandatory death penalty in 
enumerated and defined categories of killing. 
Predicting success before the Supreme Court for 
such proposals is engaging in a perilous game. Some 
proposals are either based on hints and hunches, or 
upon a cynical belief that members of the Court will 
change their minds because of public pressure or that 
the composition of the Court will be changed. 
For whatever reason, an instant legend has sprung 
up declaring that a mandatory Death Penalty-totally 
without discretion-would be constitutionally permis-
sible. This belief is usually based upon the concurring 
opinions of Justices White and Stewart in the Furman 
case. These two Justices stopped short of the finding 
of per se unconstitutionality, but held that the unequal 
application of the penalty was constitutionally defec-
tive. As Justice Stewart wrote: 
I simply conclude that the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the 
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infliction of a sentence of death under legal 
systems that permit this unique penalty to 
be so wantedly and freakishly imposed. 1 7 
Or, as Justice White wrote: 
... A jury, in its own discretion, and 
without violating its trust or any statutory 
policy, may refuse to impose the death pen-
alty no matter what the circumstances of the 
crime. Legislative "policy" is thus neces-
sarily defined not by what juries and judges 
do in exercising the discretion so regularly 
conferred upon them. In my judgment what 
was done in these cases violated the Eighth 
Amendment. 1 s 
It must be emphasized that the failure of Justices 
White and Stewart to hold the Death Penalty to be 
unconstitutional per se in no way allows the inference 
that they believe it is not unconstitutional per se. They 
simply didn't reach the issue. 1 v 
It is perhaps relevant to note that, after Furman, 
the first efforts of the Death Penalty proponents were 
to argue that the Pennsylvania provision was still viable 
because it was not arbitrarily, selectively or discrimi-
natorily applied. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
relying on Furman, has stated: 
... the United States Supreme Court re-
cently held that the imposition of the death 
penalty under statutes such as the one pur-
suant to which the death penalty was imposed 
upon appellant is violative of the Eighth and 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, 
appellant's sentence of death may not now 
be imposed.20 
And the Philadelphia District Attorney's office ef-
forts to present statistical evidence to refute the un-
fairness argument-claiming that there has been no 
discrimination under Pennsylvania statutes-has been 
thwarted by the Supreme Courts of Pennsylvania and 
the United States. 21 
Even as two Justices who voted in the majority did 
not reach the issue of a mandatory Death Penalty, two 
dissenting Justices cast strong doubt on its ultimate 
constitutionality. Writing of his "distate, antipathy, and, 
indeed, abhorence, for the death penalty, with all its 
aspects of physical distress and fear and of moral 
judgment exercised by finite mind", 2 2 Justice Blackmun 
warned against the mandatory penalty stating: 
This approach, it seems to me, encourages 
legislation that is regressive and of an antique 
mold, for it eliminates the element of mercy 
in the imposition of punishment. I thought 
we had passed beyond that point in our 
criminology long ago.23 
Chief Justice Burger also expressed strong opposi-
tion to mandatory death sentences: 
It seems remarkable to me that with our 
basic trust in lay jurors as the keystone in 
our system of criminal justice, it should now 
- . . 
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be suggested that we take the most sensitive 
and important of all decisions away from 
them. 1 could more easily be persuaded that 
mandatory sentences of death, without the 
intervening and ameliorating impact of Jay 
jurors, are so arbitrary and doctrinaire that 
they violate the Constitution. The very infre-
quency of death penalties imposed by jurors 
attests their cautious and discriminating re-
servation of that penalty for the most extreme 
cases. I had thought that nothing was clearer 
in history, as we noted in McGautha one 
year ago than the American abhorrence of 
"the common-law rule imposing a mandatory 
death sentence on all convicted murderers." 
... the 19th century movement away from 
mandatory death sentences marked an en-
lightened introduction of flexibility into the 
sentencing process. It recognized that in-
dividual culpability is not always measured 
by the category of the crime committed. This 
change in sentencing practice was created 
by the Court as a humanizing develop-
ment.~~ 
Thus, a careful reading of the nine opinions in 
Furman, can give little comfort to those who see a 
Supreme Court embracing the mandatory death sen-
tence as a constitutionally viable alternative to those 
statutes presently voided. A solid majority stands in 
their way-whatever way they turn. 
Some proponents of restoration of the death pen-
alty urge that adoption of a mandatory death penalty 
would have the useful effect of forcing defendants to 
waive trial by jury by entering guilty pleas to the lesser 
offense. Plea bargaining to facilitate the administration 
of criminal justice is an issue that divides prosecutors. 
Its proponents, who argue that the death penalty 
should be mandated by statute so that prosecutors 
could extract a bargained-for plea, run the grave risk 
of imposing a constitutionally fatal defect. 
In 1968, the United States Supreme Court held that 
the death penalty provision of the federal kidnapping 
statute was an "impermissible burden on the exercise 
of a constitutional right"2 5 
. . . the defendant who abandons the 
right to contest his guilt before a jury is 
assured that he cannot be executed; the de-
fendant ingenious enough to seek a jury ac-
quittal stands forwarned that, if the jury 
finds him guilty and does not wish to spare 
his life, he will die . . . the inevitable effect 
of any such provision is, of course, to dis-
courage assertion of the Fifth Amendment 
right not to plead guilty, and to deter exer-
cise of the Sixth Amendment right to de-
mand a jury trial. 2 6 
The adoption of a mandatory death penalty statute 
to force bargaining for a lesser penalty would plunge 
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us into the Catch-22 world where only those who in-
sisted on their innocence and demanded their consti-
tutional protections could be put to death. 
This the Constitution and the Supreme Court would 
not allow. 
There are, of course, other basic reasons why a 
mandatory death sentence would be both historically 
regressive and constitutionally untenable. As the Su-
preme Court recognized the year before the Furman 
case, the centuries-old history of the death penalty 
reflected a distinct rebellion against the mandatory 
sentence.27 Reforms embraced attempts to limit cer-
tain crimes to be punishable by death. The categories 
were defined, and crimes falling within those cate-
gories brought a mandatory death sentence. But: 
... jurors on occasion took the law into 
their own hands in cases which were "will-
ful, deliberate, and premeditated" in any 
view of that phrase, but which nevertheless 
were clearly inappropriate for the death pen-
alty. In such cases they simply refused to 
convict of the capital offense .... in order to 
meet the problem of jury nullification, legis-
lators did not try, as before, to define further 
the definition of capital homicides. Instead 
they adopted the method of forthrightly 
granting juries the discretion which they had 
been exercising in fact. 2 ~ 
It was this built-in jury discretion which was found 
to be obnoxious to the Constitution a year later in 
Furman. 
There cannot be a valid mandatory death penalty. 
The essential discretionary character of our criminal 
justice system carries the seeds of constitutional self-
destruction. As Chief Justice Burger said in his 
Furman dissent: 
... unless the Court in McGautha mis-
judged the experience of history, there is little 
reason to believe that sentencing standards 
in any form will substantially alter the discre-
tionary character of the prevailing system of 
sentencing in capital cases. 2 n 
And Mr. Justice Douglas wrote as part of the ma-
jority in the same case: 
Any law which is nondiscriminatory on its 
face may be applied in such a way as to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
118 U.S. 356. Such conceivably might be the 
fate of a mandatory death penalty, where 
equal or lesser sentences were imposed on the 
elite, as harsher one on the minorities or 
members of the lower castes.::; 0 
Some proponents of the mandatory death penalty 
recognize, and even rely on, the essential discretionary 
nature of the system. Acknowledging that a mandatory 
penalty could do severe injustice, they are content to 
rely on the pardoning powers to ameliorate the built-in 
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harshness. This action converts the process from man-
datory to discretionary. Even before a case could reach 
the Pardons Board, there are numerous incidents where 
discretion could attach-before the appellate courts, 
in rulings of a trial judge, in the process of "jury nulli-
fication", in grand jury deliberations, and at prelimi-
nary hearings. But it is prosecutorial discretion - at 
the outset of a criminal case-that presents the great-
est chance for abuse and thus brings the greatest op-
portunity for constitutional rejection. As Professor 
Bedau has recently written: 
... mandatory death penalties do not elim-
inate discretion. They shift it from the trial 
jury to the prosecutor's office. Instead of leav-
ing it up to the jury whether to sentence to 
death or to prison, mandatory death penal-
ties allow the prosecutor to decide whether to 
indict for a capital crime or for a lesser 
offense, in order to reduce the risk of the 
jury's refusal to convict. There is no reason 
to believe that such discretion would be ex-
ercised without bias, especially in death 
penalty cases, where aroused community 
sentiment and possible political advantage 
are involved. It is very unlikely that the 
Supreme Court would allow such discretion 
to prosecutors when it has denied comparable 
discretion to juries.::~ 1 
The danger of unbridled executive discretion is not 
abstract. We read of it daily. Although not always 
immediately visible and often hidden from exposure, 
discriminatory discretion does occur. It would be 
neither unknown or unbelievable to learn that a 
prosecutor, in a case where there existed prima facie 
evidence of homicide, nonetheless refused to press 
charges or moved to dismiss the case because friends 
were involved or law enforcement could be injured. 
However worthy the motive, such untenable prose-
cutorial discrimination has occurred, is wrong and will 
render any mandatory death penalty unconstitutional. 
Not in Pennsylvania-
Even if there were a possibility that a mandatory 
death penalty could survive constitutional attack, we 
should let others test it first. Pennsylvania has led the 
fight against the death penalty since the efforts of 
William Penn in 1682. :-1 2 A century later, in 1794, 
Pennsylvania was the first to reduce capital crimes to 
one. 3 a In 1834, the Commonwealth abolished public 
executions. ::4 We should not profane this proud history 
of commitment to the value of human life by rushing 
to follow other states who have enacted death penalties. 
From a purely practical concern for the administra-
tion of criminal justice, we should wait. If we were 
to reinstate the death sentence, we could anticipate a 
significant increase in the cost of the administration of 
justice, and an unwelcome clogging of already con-
gested courts. For it costs more to execute a man 
than to maintain him in prison for the rest of his life. 3 5 
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And because execution is both extreme and final, legal 
counsel invoke every procedural safeguard, every right 
of appeal, and every opening for collateral attack to 
save their clients from death. The inevitable result 
is congestion. 
The mandatory death penalty will reach the United 
States Supreme Court. The best course, both economi-
cal and prudent, would be for Pennsylvania to wait, 
observe; and, if any statute survives constitutional 
scrutiny, consider eliminating it. 
Other Priorities-
Proponents of the death penalty act in good faith 
and with honest concern for the protection of innocent 
human life. But there are other, more demanding ways 
to bring this about. 
The surest deterrent to capital crime would be the 
certain knowledge that such criminals will be quickly 
caught, swiftly tried, certainly convicted, and imprisoned 
for life. If we really wish to protect human life, let's 
turn our attention and change our priorities to paying 
our police more, improving the quality of our law 
enforcement process, speeding trials and making a 
life sentence the certain result of murder. It boggles all 
but the most sophisticated mind to see advocates of a 
mandatory death penalty, purportedly designed to pro-
tect the lives of prison guards, tolerating budget cuts 
that mean fewer guards and can only deny them the 
added protection they must have. 
And if we really care about protecting human life, 
there are other priorities too that have a far greater 
potential for saving lives. 
In the last full year covered by FBI reports, some 
11,600 people were shot to death-and the vast ma-
jority were in cases where the death penalty would 
never have been applied, :l H and thus never could have 
been a deterrent. Take away firearms, and thousands 
of deaths could be prevented. 
In Pennsylvania alone last year, 2,333 people were 
killed in highways accidents. About half involved drunk 
drivers. Take away licenses and keep drunk drivers off 
the road-and more than a thousand lives could be 
saved in this state alone next year. 
There are other ways to honor human life-better 
ways than to kill to do it honor. We can throw society's 
weight behind alternatives to abortion. We can end the 
indiscriminate mass killing of war. We can improve 
health care, attack poverty, reduce infant mortality. 
All of these suggestions then can save and value 
human life. By reordering our priorities-by avoiding 
war, improving the quality of life, making our highways 
safe, adopting strict gun control, and forging a truly 
effective and efficient criminal justice system-we can 
save countless thousands of human lives. 
Against that potential, a return to the death penalty 
seems small and mean. Measured against the chance 
to do so much good-it seems intolerably wasteful 
for the Legislature to be so preoccupied with a device 
of such little application. 
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It was our evolving sense of decency that brought us 
to the point of abandoning the death penalty. It would 
be a tragic denial of this beautiful evolution were 
we to return to that demeaning and bestial practice. 
So-because we don't need the death penalty, be-
cause it doesn't deter, because it can't be constitutional, 
because of Pennsylvania's heritage, and because pro-
tection of human life is more important-we should 
not regress. 
Surely we can be better than that. 
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Specter 
(Continued from page 6) 
fenders charged with non-violent crimes and was aimed 
at cutting into the court backlog and thereby freeing 
court time for the trial of repeaters and violent crimi-
nals . It was inten9ed to divert persons from the 
criminal process to treatment alternatives before they 
fell into a pattern of criminal activity, by combining 
the incentive of a fresh start with the threat of renewed 
prosecution if the new start was not taken. 
The program has been so successful that the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania by order of May 24, 
1972, adopted Criminal Procedural Rules 175 to 185 
which provided the procedures for an Accelerated Re-
habilitative Disposition. By comment to those Rules, 
the Committee noted that "ARD" is based upon the 
presently existing practice in Philadelphia and that its 
stated purpose is to eliminate the need for lengthy 
motions, trials and other court proceedings in cases 
which are relatively minor or which involve s_ocial or 
behavior problems which can best be solved by pro-
grams and treatment rather than punishment. 
The District Attorney's Office employs a full-time 
assistant district attorney and supporting paralegal and 
clerical personnel to screen all cases initiated by arrest 
to determine appropriateness for the ARD Program. 
Exceptional cases and requests by defense counsel for 
reconsideration are specially reviewed by the chief of 
the ARD Unit. Upon being accepted, both the de-
fendant and the complainant are advised of participa-
tion in the program by letter. If the terms of the 
program are agreeable to both, the case is listed for 
aa ARD hearing before Judge Hoffman who, after a 
brief absence, is again sitting as the hearing judge. 
Cases are heard two days each week. At these in-
formal hearings, an assistant district attorney, defense 
attorney and representatives from local non-profit so-
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cial service agencies, join with the judge in appropri-
ately disposing of the cases. 
With the help of an LEAA grant, my Office has 
contracted with HELP, Inc., a non-profit drug treat-
ment and referral agency to provide rehabilitative and 
supervisory services for ARD cases. In addition, this 
grant provides for the hiring of four probation officers 
to assist the court with the supervisory functions. 
[n addition, as the program has evolved, many 
community organizations have sent representatives to 
the hearings to accept assignments in fashioning spe-
cific rehabilitation programs. The Philadelphia General 
Hospital Drug Rehabilitation Clinic is on hand to aid 
the addicts. Eagleville Hospital and Rehabilitation Cen-
ter, specializing in treating alcoholics, is a cooperating 
agency. The Center for Studies in Sexual Deviance is 
available to render supervisory service when the pro-
bation involves a problem in that area of expertise. The 
Jewish Family Service, the Public Defender's Social 
Service, the Philadelphia Psychiatric Center and other 
agencies have also voluntered support. 
In the first six months of 1973, the ARD program 
disposed of 1,616 cases while a companion program 
for drunk drivers disposed of 413 cases in the three 
month period from March 21, 1973 to June 21, 1973. 
In 1971, 1,852 cases were disposed, of which 14.7 % 
were outright dismissals and in 1972, 4,127 cases were 
disposed, of which 9.1 % were dismissals. 
In 1971 the rearrest rate from all cases involving 
auto larceny, burglary, driving vehicle intoxicated, lar-
ceny except auto, minor assault, narcotic drug vio-
lations and weapons offenses was 22.7% and in 1972 
it was 16.5%. For ARD cases, however, it was only 
16.8% in 1971 and 7.7% in 1972. 
ARD 
DEFENDANT DISPOSITIONS 
1971 1972 Total 
(Feb.-Dec.) 
Auto Larceny . 148 305 453 
Burglary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 259 316 575 
Driving while Intoxicated 8 348 356 
Larceny (except auto) . 167 327 494 
Minor Assault . 133 684 817 
Narcotic Drug Laws . 806 869 1675 
Weapons 118 174 292 
All Others 213 1104 1317 
Total 1852 4127 5979 
DISMISSAL RATES 
1971 
% 
(7.6%) 
(9.6%) 
(6.0%) 
(8.3%) 
(13.7%) 
(28.0%) 
(4.9%) 
(21.9%) 
(100.0%) 
1972 
% 
Disp./Dism. Dism. Disp./Dism. Dism. 
Auto Larceny . 148 35 26.3% 305 54 17.7% 
Burglary 259 47 18.2% 316 29 9.2% 
Driving while Intoxicated . 8 3 37.5% 348 13 3.7% 
Larceny (except auto) . 167 31 18.6% 327 40 12.2% 
Minor Assault ............ 133 35 23.7% 684 164 24.0% 
Narcotic Drug Laws . 806 70 8.7% 869 56 6.4% 
Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 20 17.0% 174 31 17.8% 
Total 1639 241 14.7% 3023 387 9.1% 
Some Case Histories 
David Smith's long red hair fell almost to his 
shoulders when he appeared for his pre-indictment 
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probation hearing. It was hard to tell his age behind 
his bushy red mustache until a review of the police 
record showed that he was only 20. The charge on 
the police blotter was a serious one: illegal possession 
of narcotics. Smith's case is similar to thousands of 
prosecutions which are now parading through the crim-
inal courts in the United States. 
Two plain-clothed police officers saw him smoking 
an unusual looking cigaret in yellow paper. Accord-
ing to the police report, the officers believed the cigaret 
was marijuana. An arrest and search followed, dis-
closing eight more cigarets in Smith's trousers. The 
police analysis showed all contained marijuana. David 
Smith had no prior criminal record. 
This arrest threatened the rest of Smith's life. A 
conviction would block him from a possible career in 
law, medicine or accounting. On any application for 
a sensitive job, David Smith would be called upon 
to disclose his police record. Perhaps most important 
of all, he would carry the scar of a criminal conviction 
in his own mind for as long as he lived. 
The traditional handling of a case like David 
Smith's in our criminal courts left much to be desired. 
After arrest and preliminary hearing, the transcript 
would be forwarded to the grand jury. Indictment 
would be automatic. Smith would then have been re-
quired to appear five weeks later for an arraignment, 
when a trial date would be set. Because of the crowded 
criminal docket, the case would be listed half a dozen 
times or more before a courtroom, judge, prosecuting 
attorney, defense lawyer, defendant and witness could 
be simultaneously assembled. 
Defendants like Smith would doubtless be con-
victed-unless the evidence of the marijuana cigarets 
was excluded at trial on the ground that the police 
lacked probable cause to make a constitutional search 
and seizure. After that lengthy process, Smith would 
doubtless be placed on probation. In big city courts, 
district attorneys have great difficulty persuading 
judges to send repeaters to jail, even where crimes of 
violence are involved. It would be a foregone conclu-
sion that a young · man like David Smith would be 
placed on probation, and that would be the proper 
disposition. 
The results of this traditional approach are dis-
astrous. The defendant walks away from the court-
room wondering what it was all about. Why was he 
arrested, indicted, arraigned and brought to City Hall 
for six trial dates on such an insignificant matter? 
Even the judge recognized it was insignificant, because 
he let him go. The police are frustrated. What is the 
point in making such arrests, commanded by the state 
penal code, when the judge consistently puts the de-
fendant on probation? The judicial system buckles 
under the onerous administrative burden of trials on 
such lesser offenses, leaving the courts little time for 
the serious cases. Conservatively, the exercise in futility 
attendant to David Smith's charge would· cost the tax-
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payers about $1,000. 
Under the new system of pre-indictment probation, 
however the complex prosecution chain is broken be-
fore indictment. While efforts are now being made to 
screen out some cases even before arrest, the most 
logical point of interception once the arrest has been 
made is immediately before the grand jury hears the 
evidence. An experienced district attorney reviews 
cases which have been held by a committing magis-
trate for action by the grand jury; and the prosecutor 
screens out the lesser, non-violent charges where the 
defendant has no prior conviction or only minimal 
police contacts. Those cases are placed on a special 
list for Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition. 
The hearing proceeds like a meeting instead of a 
trial. The clash and clamor of the courtroom are ab-
sent. The formalism of the robed judge on a pedestal 
is gone. There is no witness chair or defendant's dock. 
No witnesses are called, although notice is sent to the 
private complainants to give them an opportunity to 
be present. When the defendant sits at the table next 
to the assistant district attorney and across from the 
judge, he can see that there are no demons out to get 
him. Some of the defendants have openly expressed 
surprise that they were being treated in such a sensible 
way. This eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation similarly 
gives the judge fresh insight into the personality and 
problem of the defendant. The focus shifts to what 
should be done to help this defendant stay out of 
trouble in the future. 
At the start of the session, the hearing room is us-
ually crowded with 50 or 60 people, awaiting the call 
of their cases. Most of the faces are black or young 
or both. The younger defendants are frequently ac-
compained by their parents. The mother or father 
usually appears much more anxious about the whole 
affair than the youthful defendants, whose faces fre-
quently reflect an open skepticism about what the sys-
tem is going to do to them next. 
The district attorney quietly calls each case in turn. 
No longer is the gravel voice of the court bailiff heard 
with the bellowing tone: "The Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania versus John Defendant," which begins 
the formalism in the regular criminal courtroom. After 
the defendant and his attorney are seated at the con-
ference table, the assistant district attorney introduces 
himself and the judge and then proceeds to explain 
the operation of the system. A court stenographer 
records the district attorney's explanation that: (1) the 
program gives the defendant a chance to earn a full 
discharge if he completes it satisfactorily; (2) should 
the defendant violate the terms of probation by getting 
into trouble with the law, he can be indicted and pro-
secuted on the original charge; (3) his agreement to 
participate in the program involves a waiver of his 
right to a speedy trial, so far as any delays attributed 
to this program are concerned. When the defendant 
indicates his understanding of the program and his 
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willingness to partiCipate, the court reporter takes no 
further notes until the judge is ready to announce the 
disposition of the case. 
Nothing said by the defendant can be used against 
him in any later proceeding. That was the setting when 
David Smith sat down at the conference table after 
his case was called for ARD. 
His face was impassive. The district attorney opened 
a slender file and quietly read the police version show-
ing Smith in possession of nine marijuana cigarets. 
The one-page police report took less than two minutes 
to read. Smith's attorney said it was all true. The judge 
then asked Smith why he started smoking marijuana. 
Smith replied that he had taken it up for kicks. Under 
questioning by the judge, Smith acknowledged that he 
understood that he could be subjected to an extensive 
prison sentence up to five years for possession of 
marijuana. A tough but unstuffy lecture followed, with 
the judge informing Smith that he was being given a 
chance to clean the slate of this youthful indiscretion, 
providing he behaved himself during a two-year period 
of probation. 
Smith breathed a sigh of relief as he left the con-
ference table, and so did the criminal justice system. 
A case which could have tied up a judge, police officers, 
witnesses, attorneys and the defendant for hours or 
days had been concluded in a very few minutes. And 
it was a very sensible way to handle the matter. Had 
it gone through the old procedure, it would have likely 
ended in probation. But the case could have scarred 
both Smith and the court system. 
Another typical case involved the charge of re-
ceiving stolen goods against Herbert White. White had 
been observed by police attempting to start a stolen 
car, while a second man stood in front of the auto-
mobile with the hood open. White claimed that he was 
merely helping out a friend by taking the automobile 
for repairs. After police filed a charge of receiving 
stolen goods, White was held for action of the grand 
jury under nominal bail. 
Under the old system, this case probably would 
have dragged through the courts for more than a year 
for the same result of one year's probation. 
Raymond Robinson presented a pathetic picture 
when his case was called for a pre-indictment probation 
hearing. 
He had been arrested after a homeowner returned 
to her home at about 6 P.M. one evening finding 
Robinson in a dazed condition inside the house. 
Robinson was charged with burglary, forcible entry, 
vagrancy and breach of the peace, and was committed 
to prison when he could not raise $1500 bail. 
At the pre-indictment probation hearing, Robinson 
explained that he had been beaten up earlier that day 
and had wandered around in a daze not knowing 
where he was. His claim that he had no intention to 
steal anything was confirmed by the fact that nothing 
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was taken from the house. On these facts, it was clear 
that he should not have been charged with burglary. 
The only charge supported by the evidence was for-
cible unlawful entry. 
For a 4 7 -year-old man with no prior record, the 
seven weeks in jail was more than sufficient. He was 
placed on probation for one year in a hearing which 
focused on the available social services which could 
help him. Had he spent several months in jail awaiting 
trial in the normal course of events, he would certainly 
have received no tougher sentence from a judicial sys-
tem which repeatedly places recidivist burglars on 
probation. 
Edith Carter was a 49-year-old prostitute. When she 
sat down at the conference table for her pre-indictment 
probation hearing, everyone present wondered how 
such an ugly woman could succeed in her chosen 
profession. But some prostitution cases are like that. 
She was a freelance, casual operator. 
The brief police report stated that she had struck 
up a conversation with a police officer in Philadelphia's 
Chinatown and had propositioned him. They then went 
to a local hotel, where they had a drink before check-
ing into a room. After she had completely disrobed 
and accepted $25, the undercover officer arrested her 
for prostitution, solicitation to commit sodomy, accept-
ing bawdy money, and immoral practices. Notwith-
standing the multiple charges, it boiled down to a 
prostitution case. 
Although she had three prior arrests but no con-
victions for prostitution, a jail sentence would have 
served no useful purpose. The one-year probation, 
which she received in this program, was doubtless the 
same sentence she would have gotten had her case 
traveled the tortuous regular prosecution path through 
multiple listings over many months. 
Several checks had been stolen from the home of a 
Merion doctor. Mary Ann Jackson , 46, attempted to 
cash one of these checks for $335 in a business es-
tablishment. The proprietor became suspicious and 
called the police. The check was traced to a theft 
at the doctor's residence. 
Based on the nature of the charge and the fact that 
Mary Ann Jackson had no prior criminal record, this 
case was selected for the pre-indictment program. In 
normal course, the doctor was notified about the Dis-
trict Attorney's intention to handle the case in the new 
way. He responded as follows: "In respect to your 
letter about Mary Ann Jackson, I heartily approve 
placing her upon pre-indictment probation. The entire 
program seems like an excellent idea, and perhaps will 
be at least one step toward doing something about the 
disgraceful backlog in our criminal courts." 
ARD allows less serious cases involving first of-
fenders to be diverted from the traditional criminal 
justice system. 
The result is a saving in time for all concerned-
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the time of police as witnesses at trial, of prosecutors 
and public defenders, of judges and jurors. The police 
are free to investigate and the prosecutors are free to 
try cases involving crimes of violence and judges and 
juries are free to hear and decide them. 
Everyone wins. The police, the prosecutors, the 
judiciary and, most importantly, the public. 
Pollak 
(Continued from page 7) 
could do no other than nod assent, but all the while 
I was remembering the unbroken string of Cs which 
had marked my progress through law school." 
I have said that speaking words of welcome and 
congratulation to newly minted law school graduates 
entering the profession is a happy task, and so it is. 
But it is not without ambiguity. Am I to say to 
you, as was said by the speaker at commencement at 
Florida Technological University last Friday, "In the 
whole history of the world, in all of the nations of the 
world, there has never been a time I would rather be 
a graduate than in the year 1973 in the United States 
of America"? I'm afraid that neither the substance 
nor the style of that communique persuades me. Not-
withstanding that it comes to us with the imprimatur 
of the President of the United States, it is, in my judg-
ment, inoperative. 
Most of us have come to the law not simply to 
make a living-not that this is an objective to be 
scorned, but there are broader boulevards to middle-
and-upper-middle classness-but rather because law is 
in our country the preeminently public profession. We 
have known since Tocqueville's time that lawyers are 
the shapers and monitors-in Tocqueville's terms, the 
natural aristocrats-of American democracy. We have 
hoped it was true in our own time. Notwithstanding 
war, racial strife, the blight of poverty, the wasting of 
cities, the alienation of the young and the anonymity 
of the old, the clouding of water and air, and the lit-
tering and pillaging and paving of our green and pleas-
ant land-notwithstanding all these, we looked to law 
as the way and means to fulfill our democratic prom-
ises: The law of Brown v. Board of Education; the 
law of the Atomic Test Ban and SALT; the law which 
provides funds for schools and medical care, or bars 
discrimination, or strengthens the franchise. 
But five years ago-the brutal year when Martin 
Luther King and Robert Kennedy were killed-law 
became "law and order." The American people were 
told by a lawyer who sought the Presidency: "The 
Miranda and Escobedo decisions of the High Court 
have had the effect of seriously hamstringing the peace 
forces in our society and strengthening the criminal 
forces." The lawyer was elected. His regard for the 
High Court was soon evidenced by the fact that two 
of his nominees for Associate Justice were rejected by 
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the Senate-and of the second nominee the lawyer-
Senator who had charge of the nomination on the 
Administration's behalf had this to say: "Even if he 
were mediocre, there are a lot of mediocre judges and 
people and lawyers and they are entitled to a little 
representation, aren't they?" A year later, in 1971, an-
other lawyer-Senator, the then Chairman of the Re-
publican National Committee, gave a speech which 
contained further revealing insights into the Adminis-
tration's attitude towards law and legal institutions: 
A hard-hitting Attorney General, John 
Mitchell, is using every weapon in the law-
enforcement arsenal to bring gangsters to 
justice and deter crime in the streets. Inci-
dentally, just the other day, we had another 
forceful reminder of the difference between 
our Republican Attorney General and the 
man he succeeded in office. Ramsey Clark, 
LBJ's Attorney General, announced that he 
was taking on one of the Berrigan Brothers 
as a client. No wonder extremists had a hey-
day under the Democrats, when they knew 
that the chief law-enforcement official of 
the federal government was a left-leaning 
marshmallow like Ramsey Clark! 
Today we are witnessing the curious re-
sults. A responsible Attorney General is 
fighting the bomb-throwers and advocates of 
lawlessness in our midst, while an irrespon-
sible former Attorney General, Democrat 
Ramsey Clark, is acting as lawyer for ac-
cused conspirators! 
You couldn't ask for a clearer example 
of what is wrong with the leadership of the 
Democratic Party today-or what is right 
with the Nixon's Administration's efforts to 
fight crime and violence. 
There is another view of the lawyer's role, and 
under that view Ramsey Clark, as a private lawyer, 
might reasonably have supposed that representing one 
accused of crime, who sought his professional aid, was 
a matter of professional responsibility, even when the 
accused was Philip Berrigan-just as, some years be-
fore, when he was Attorney General, Ramsey Clark 
had found it to be his professional responsibility to 
his client, the United States, to prosecute both the 
Berrigan Brothers on other charges. But that is a view 
of the lawyer's role which apparently did not com-
mend itself to the lawyer-Senator-Chairman of the 
Republican National Committee. It is, after all, an 
old-fashioned view, and one which, like the Miranda 
rule, runs the risk of "seriously hamstringing the 
peace forces in our society and strengthening the crim-
inal forces." 
Rejecting old-fashioned notions, the present Admin-
istration seems to have been imbued with an up-to-
date, efficiency-oriented (if not strict constructionist) 
view of law and legal institutions. Particularly that 
26 
view has characterized a number of those who were 
recently in or close to the White House-men to 
whom there was delegated major authority to imple-
ment the President's Constitutional obligation to " take 
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed"-and it 
seems to have led them to low-water mark. 
Even though we don't yet know the full story, we 
probably know enough to document a plausible argu-
ment that our system-the system within which we 
lawyers have been taught to work-is bankrupt. In-
deed, a brief supporting just that thesis has already 
been written. Permit me to read excerpts from Henry 
Adams' observations of events a century ago-when 
1 ay Gould, in 1869, tried to corner gold , and Wash-
ington was alive with conjecture as to who, in high 
official station, had acquiesced in the calamitous gold 
conspiracy: 
Although the fault lay somewhere on the 
Administration , and could lie nowhere else, 
the trail always faded and died out at the 
point where any member of the Administra-
tion became visible. . . . With the con-
ventional air of assumed confidence, every 
one in public assured everyone else that the 
President himself was the savior of the situa-
tion, and in private assured each other that 
if the President had not been caught this 
time, he was s~re to be trapped the next, for 
the ways of Wall Street were dark and 
and double ... . 
... That Grant should have fallen, within 
six months, into such a morass ... rendered 
the outlook for the next four years-prob-
ably eight-possibly twelve-mysterious, or 
frankly opaque, to a young man who had 
hitched his wagon , as Emerson told him, to 
the star of reform. The country might outlive 
it, but not he. The worst scandals of the 
eighteenth century were relatively harmless 
by the side of this, which smirched executive, 
judiciary, banks, corporate systems, profes-
sions, and people, all the great active forces 
of society, in one dirty cesspool of vulgar 
corruption. . . . 
. . . For satirists or comedians, the study 
was rich and endless, and they exploited its 
corners with happy results. . . . Rich and 
poor joined in throwing contempt on their 
own representatives. Society laughed a vague 
and meaningless derision over its own 
failure .... 
... The political dilemma was as clear in 
1870 as it was likely to be in 1970. The sys-
tem of 1789 had broken down, and with it 
the eighteenth-century fabric of a priori, or 
moral principles. Politicians had tacitly given 
it up . ... 
America has produced few people of Henry Adams' 
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brilliance. But much of his power lay in his relentless 
didacticism. He did not suffer fools gladly, nor knaves 
either: but if he had found none about him, he might 
well have created them (himself somewhat osten-
tatiously included) to make his points. And one of the 
chief points, for this chronicler and prophet of doom, 
was that the presuppositions of democracy were hum-
bug--or, at best, sentimental anachronisms unrelated 
to the vast impersonal forces hurrying history to the 
deluge: "The political dilemma," you recall Adams 
saying, "was as clear in 1870 as it was likely to be in 
1970. The system of 1789 had broken down, and with 
it the eighteenth century fabric of a priori, or moral, 
principles." 
But people in 1789 were no more virtuous than a 
century later, or a century later still; nor did the 
Framers perceive them to be. Self-interest as the domi-
nant rule of life was the Framers' forthrightly accepted 
premise: " ... [W]hat is government itself," asked the 
author of the fifty-first Federalist paper, "but the great-
est of all reflections on on human nature? If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary." 
Moreover, the events of 1869-70, which Adams 
depicted as cataclysmic, hardly seem insurmountable 
to our nineteen-seventies' view. We have learned that 
government can deal with wrongdoers worse than 
Gould and his colleagues-for example, those whom 
Franklin Roosevelt called "private malefactors of 
great wealth," and also those greater miscreants, the 
public malefactors, who, like Governors Faubus and 
Barnett, in the late nineteen-fifties and early 'sixties, 
warred on the Constitution from state sanctuaries, or 
who, like Secretary Fall in Harding's time or Judge 
Manton a generation ago, used high national office to 
commit high crimes. If today's miscreants are more 
numerous and more powerful than their predecessors, 
there seem happily to continue to be great reservoirs or 
countervailing power in the checking institutions which 
we have prudently maintained-the press; the Congress; 
and, most notably and enduringly, the courts, and 
especially the Supreme Court. Indeed, I think it par-
ticularly bears remembering that the Court, speaking 
in the firm accents of Mr. Justice Powell, and without 
dissent, rejected the claim of Attorney General Mitchell 
that the President has inherent power to engage in 
domestic wiretapping without a warrant: "We recog-
nize, as we have before, the constitutional basis of the 
President's domestic security role, but we think it must 
be exercised in a manner compatible with the Fourth 
Amendment." 
In short, I think the debacle we are witnessing is 
manageable, and only manageable, within the frame-
work of our free institutions. Indeed, provided we 
stick fast to our resolve that a Mitchell or a Stans or 
a Haldemann or an Erlichman is as fully entitled to 
due process as an Ellsberg, we will prove anew the 
strength of those institutions. 
We learn inuch about our institutions from the per-
ceptions-whether accurate or skewed-of those who, 
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like Henry Adams, observe the human condition. But 
to make our institutions work we also need the more 
commonplace skills of participation. We need, for 
example, people like Henry's grandfather: a man of 
high ability and intelligence, albeit an intelligence 
more pedestrian than Henry's. But John Quincy 
Adams had no compelling vocational need for Henry's 
dazzling array of intuitions and syntheses. He was, 
after all, only a lawyer. (And it should in all fairness 
be acknowledged parenthetically that in his private 
practice John Quincy Adams was so faithless to the 
precepts of the profession, as enunciated in 1971 by 
the Senator-Chairman of the Republican National Com-
mittee, that he represented the slaves who mutinied on 
the Spanish schooner Amistad: but perhaps that can 
be written off to bad early training-after all, his 
lawyer-father had once represented an alleged smuggler 
named John Hancock.) John Quincy Adams devoted 
most of his professional skills to public service, not-
withstanding that he was as pessimistic as Henry would 
later be about the viability of the union. Beaten for 
reelection to the Presidency in 1828, John Quincy 
Adams saw in his successor, Andrew Jackson, much 
of what Henry was later to see in Grant. The events 
of Jackson's first term die;! nothing to reassure the 
former President. In 1832, he noted that he had once 
supposed "that the foederative union was to last for 
ages. I now disbelieve its duration for twenty years, 
and doubt its continuance for five." Yet the New 
Englander who spoke so somberly was not a bitter 
old man on the sidelines. He was just completing his 
first term in the House of Representatives. When 
elected to Congress in 1830 he had written: 
. . . [T] his call upon me by the people of 
the district in which I reside, to represent 
them in Congress, has been spontaneous, and 
although counteracted by a double opposi-
tion, federalist and J acksonite, I have re-
ceived nearly three votes in four throughout 
the district. My election as President of the 
United States was not half so gratifying to 
my inmost soul. 
And so it was that John Quincy Adams, ever more 
gloomy about the future, served in Congress for almost 
two decades, fighting disunion, and the Presidential 
adventurism called the Mexican War, and the spread 
of slavery, until, on February 21 , 1848, he was felled 
by a stroke on the floor of the House, a lawyer-citizen 
dying at his post. 
We all remember that, midway in John Quincy 
Adams' term as President, in the afternoon of the 4th 
of July, 1826, the fiftieth anniversary of the Declara-
tion of Independence, at the home of the Adamses in 
Quincy, the President's father, the old President, died. 
And we recall the report, very likely apocryphal, that 
the dying John Adams took comfort when he thought 
of his old comrade, brother-at-the-bar, and adversary, 
whose election had ended the elder Adams' public 
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career: "Jefferson still lives." And yet at noon on that 
very day, in Monticello, Jefferson died. 
Here, today, in Philadelphia, Jefferson still lives, and 
John Adams, and John Quincy Adams, and the Con-
stitution they wrought for us . For lawyers there is 
much to be done-much that is worthy of their calling. 
Powell 
(Continued from page 8) 
Under the Blank plan people would, wherever pos-
sible, demonstrate their capacities on the job. Where 
that would be impracticable, outside tests would serve 
as the basis for employment. The organized Bar and 
the medical professions have been relying on such ex-
aminations for years. In all cases the burden of proof 
of their legitimacy would remain with the using agency, 
The need for this type of legislation can best be 
explained through the use of examples. 
Hypothesize Jon S. as a typical liberal arts gradu-
ate of an urban, four year college. Upon graduation, 
Jon is recruited by a large brokerage house in a north-
eastern city and immediately enters in its "manage-
ment training program". This, of course, is folly-
considering that Jon holds a degree in Management 
that if the college had done its job, Jon should be 
able to enter the company's management structure after 
a simple adjustment period as an intern with close 
supervision to learn the ins and outs of the company 
in question. 
As a trainee, Jon is rotated among several of the 
firm's divisions, the object being to learn the operation 
inside out. He is supposed to gain technical know-
how, and experience during his training period. In ad-
dition to the on-the-job aspects of the training period, 
classroom instruction is also provided in such funda-
mentals as "writing business letters," "proper use of 
the telephone," and "public relations techniques." If 
Jon's college had been functionally oriented these 
courses could and should have been provided during 
his degree program. Rather than have the poor boy 
spend useless hours in courses that he will most prob-
ably never "use." 
At the end of his six month training period, Jon is 
placed in one of the firms small offices where his job 
principally concerns simple advice to the average stock 
buyer and a small amount of supervision over cleri-
cal help. 
Jon is faced with the fact that his four years of col-
lege preparation have been either misused or wasted. 
The skills he learned in the training program, not to 
menion his present duties, could be handled by the 
average high school graduate with the same company 
training. 
In recruiting Jon for his position, the company 
undoubtedly passed over a number of high school 
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graduates, operating in "low level" postttons in the 
company who have committed themselves to the bro-
kerage business and may well have the drive and de-
termination to be top notch employees, if given the 
chance. These employees are functioning every day 
in jobs much the same as Jon is-college degree and 
company training notwithstanding. 
What problems do we find in reviewing the saga of 
Jon S.? Preliminarily we find that college has not pre-
pared Jon for the area of endeavor which he has 
chosen to pursue. Secondly we find that the manage-
ment of the brokerage house which hired Jon is out 
of touch with its employees and has been "had" by 
the premise that college degree brings with it, motiva-
tion, as well as verbal and social skills which the aver-
age high school graduate does not possess. 
College officials contend, and rightly so, that they 
can not provide adequate on the job training for the 
variety of jobs which today exist. Several attempts 
have been made at making on the job training possi-
ble. One of the most successful is the program at 
Drexel University in Philadelphia where students are 
enrolled on a work-study basis in a five year program. 
After two years in a trimester program the student 
spends five trimesters of the next nine working in a 
field of his or her choice. The remaining four trimes-
ters are used to attempt to provide the college based 
educational experience which the student believes is 
necessary for the adjustment into the working world. 
Many executives on the other hand readily ac-
knowledge that a college degree does not of itself 
sensure the motivation or the verbal or social skills 
needed for job performance. Nor are they sure just 
what skills are most desirable for their increasingly 
diverse branches. One thing is clear to them, how-
ever. A college degree is necessary. 
Some industry recruiters claim that American busi-
ness is using college as an employment agency. The 
colleges, they say save the company time and money 
since they act as screening and training agencies. 
Why a supposed intellectual facility like a college 
or university would allow itself to be used ::ts a service 
agency for big business is not easily understood. 
It is apparent that the American college is a bu-
reauracy. We might, therefore, assume that the college 
will react like a bureaucracy and follow its rules. 
Anyone knows that rule # 1 of any bureauracy is 
to expand. The more that a college can influence 
business to restrict its "better" hiring to college gradu-
ates the bigger its hold will be on American youth. 
The more American youth desiring "better" jobs, the 
more students that college will have. And so the spiral 
continues. 
Do you know of any college or university which is 
not presently employing high cost public relations 
campaigns aimed at both big business and youth? 
This rationale becomes even clearer when we real-
ize that the budgets of our public universities depend 
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on the number of students "serviced" and not the 
quality of the students. One thing which is very clear 
is that the conflict which results is very easily covered 
since it is the colleges and big business's interests 
which are involved. 
The outlawing of degrees would be consistent with 
the realities of today's job market. 
At present I am sure that if you questioned any 
high school junior who is looking toward college, that 
student would be under the impression that the de-
mand for college graduates is steadily increasing. 
This, however, is just not true. The most optimistic 
figure that I have seen show that only 15% of the 
1975 job market will be open to the professional and 
technical sector. More than 85% of the market will 
not require a college degree and will be of the "low 
level" variety. 
Meanwhile 31% of our 18-24 year olds are in col-
lege and the projections in this category continue to 
soar. If all of the 15% of the jobs were available to 
the new grads, the number of openings would still be 
woefully inadequate. 
To satisfy this "overeducation" of today's youth we 
find some jobs being "upgraded." Such upgrading has 
resulted in the oft heard lament that even our trash 
collectors are required to be high school graduates. 
And, it seems fair to say, such absurd requirements 
are at least a partial cause of the high levels of un-
employment in our inner cities. 
With the upgrading of jobs we automatically assume 
that college is preparing our youth for these new posi-
tions. This is of course untrue. A clerk needs a college 
education to perform systematic clerical duties about 
as much as a trash collector needs a high school di-
ploma to locate the nearest city dump. 
Our scientific and technological needs have cer-
tainly bred the need for new skills, some on the high-
est level. At the same time this same technology has 
lowered a good number of our job requirements. 
Mathematical calculations performed by hand are 
a far cry from the degree of skill and logic needed to 
operate the new electronic calculators. 
What is questionable is whether a college degree as 
such is proper evidence that those new skills which 
are truly needed can be delivered. 
Obviously our society can and does manipulate job 
status. I only hope that this manipulation is in the best 
interest of all the people, not just in the best interests 
of the colleges or big business. 
Our society should spend more energy in trying to 
upgrade the dignity of all socially useful work and in 
trying to eliminate the disdain with which we presently 
view the ordinary laborer. 
It has been proven that work can make the educa-
tional experience meaningful to a much greater degree 
than college can make work meaningful. 
My concern with this cycle would be far less if 
everyone caught up in the system was happy with his 
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position. But what we have seen over the past decade 
underscores my belief that our colleges, as prisons for 
the economic futures of our students, bred the hostili-
ties and apathy which has permeated our campuses. 
Students have fallen victims to the public relations 
pitches of both the colleges and big business and have 
opted to "do their time" so to speak. The only prob-
lem with this philosophy is that the pot of gold at the 
end of the rainbow has not and is not materializing. 
And more frequently than not the "better" jobs are 
distasteful if they materialize. 
One of the major advantages of the Blank propo-
sal would be a complete evaluation of our education 
system and its goals. Something which I feel is sorely 
needed at this time. 
Perhaps our compulsory schools, for example, would 
understand that the basic skills for work and family 
life in our society would have to be provided in those 
required years of schooling. 
Colleges on the other hand could become less re-
strictive, and as open as possible to promote their 
educational goals. Free to experiment and to shape 
the future rather than be a part of the spiral as it 
now exisits. 
Our colleges would be relieved of the pressure of 
"servicing" students for economic concessions. Per-
haps our colleges could function much the same as our 
public buildings, hours could be extensive, fees mini-
mal, and the services available to anyone willing to 
comply with the course demands and holding the nec-
essary high school diploma. 
Under the system our colleges could once again 
return to their pure form , they would serve as the 
meeting place for individuals willing to search for 
philosophic and scientific truths. 
The Blank proposal would help rid our universities 
and colleges of such anarchronisms as the degree 
structure. No longer would the designations of B.A., 
M.A., and Ph.D. be necessary. In this way our gradu-
ate education would freely be separated into greater 
and lesser degrees of complexity in each of the disci-
plines and be clearly understood as what it is more 
education not just another degree. 
The new freedom would make programs such as 
Drexel's unnecessary. After all, as successful and use-
ful as Drexel's program is in its present form, as part 
of our present system it is above all a cop-out and 
tacit admission that the campus itself is unnecessary 
for many genuinely educational experiences. 
The legislations which Professor Blank proposes, 
and which I wholeheartedly support, would help to 
recapture the dignity of the workplace. It would also 
lead to the increasing of the dignity of our citadels of 
learning. It would help to restore to all people a sense 
of their basic worth and it should prove to them that 
their worth as human beings cannot be measured by 
the arbitrary reception of degrees. 
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Wallis 
(Continued from page 9) 
strike the observer as the driving lawyer she is. 
In 1970, she filed and argued Santiago vs. McElroy, 
a landmark case in which a three-judge Federal court 
ruled that landlords who impounded and sold their 
tenants' furniture without a prior hearing were violating 
the Constitution. 
The area of tenants' rights still interests her, al-
though she has branched out into many new areas 
since then. 
She still works part time as support attorney for the 
North Philadelphia Tenants Union. 
"It's making great progress," she said. "The theory 
is to organize the tenants in North Philadelphia to take 
concerted action to improve their housing conditions. 
"There are 4,000 members, organized into locals. 
"Some of the people who work there are law students 
and some kind of wander in. I like the idea of working 
with people who share an interest in the same things. 
"We write to people who are getting evicted and 
offer free legal aid, handle problems reasonably related 
to housing. 
"Some of the problems really do require a lawyer, 
although 50 to 60 per cent of the work could be 
handled by anyone. A lot of the work just involves 
calling Licenses and Inspections." 
In recent months, her interest in tenants' rights has 
been gradually taken over by the women's movement. 
"The Pennsylvania Abortion Rights Association 
asked me to handle a case challenging Pennsylvania's 
abortion laws. 
"Then I called the Women's Center and started tak-
ing some cases. There are some really great things 
happening there. Women should support each other-
that's what it's all about." 
Ms. Wallis is one of four children, the daughter of 
a psychoanalyst. 
"My father wanted me to be a doctor, but we sort of 
compromised and I went to Penn Law School. 
"When I went to school, there was no such thing as 
Community Legal Services, although it was formed by 
the time I graduated. 
"There are so many programs for law students to get 
involved with, and it's a great way to get experience." 
One of the best indicators of Ms. Wallis' lifestyle 
is her home. 
A large warehouse on Rodman st. in center city, 
her home has rough brick walls, unpainted floors, and 
few interior walls-no compartmentalism. 
Her husband, Charlie, a sculptor, is currently work-
ing on building an office for her on the first floor. (Her 
office is now located in their third floor bedroom.) 
They have no yard, although they have a great view 
of the park across the street-"and the city takes care 
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of it," she says with a laugh. 
And the future? 
"I never make plans for the future. 
"I hope to have the intuition about what is timely 
and important, so that I can deal with those things and 
grow when they come along." 
Levin 
(Continued from page 6) 
its recommendations for changes in the geographical 
boundaries of the circuits as may be most appropriate 
for the expeditious and effective disposition of judicial 
business; and 
(b) to study the structure and internal procedures 
of the Federal courts of appeal system, and to report 
to the President, the Congress, the Chief Justice its 
recommendations for such additional changes in struc-
ture or internal procedure as may be appropriate for 
the expeditious and effective disposition of the case-
load of the Federal Courts of Appeals, consistent with 
fundamental concepts of fairness and due process. 
Professor Levin, commenting on the mandate of 
the Commission, said, "the Commission is charged 
with studying urgent problems in the operation of the 
Federal courts of appeal. Congress has mandated that 
it take a comprehensive view of the operation of the 
circuit courts-the first in over three-quarters of a 
century. I cannot , predict what will emerge from the 
Commission's work, but there exists the potential for 
change of tremendous significance to the entire 
country." 
Professor Levin has been a member of the Law 
School faculty since 1949. He has also served as 
Director of the National Institute for Trial Advocacy 
and as Chairman of the Pennsylvania Legislative Re-
appointment Commission. He will be on leave of 
absence from the University until January, 1975, when 
the work of the Commission will have been completed. 
The Deputy Director of the Commission is also an 
alumnus of the Law School, Philip Shuchman, '53, a 
professor at the University of Connecticut School of 
Law. Mr. Shuchman served as Deputy Director of 
the Committee on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United 
States in 1971-72. 
- Ruth 
(Continued from page 7) 
range of inquiries under Cox's jurisdiction. 
The appointment of Ruth added to the strong 
Kennedy flavor of the special Watergate prosecution 
team. A Democrat, Ruth worked in the Justice De-
partment from 1961 to 1965, under Presidents Ken-
nedy and Johnson. Cox was solicitor general under 
President Kennedy, and four of his other top aides 
were in the Justice Department during that period. 
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A Philadelphia native, Ruth attended Episcopal 
Academy, Yale University and the Law School. After 
serving in the Army Counter-Intelligence Corps. he 
joined the Philadelphia firm of Saul, Ewing, Remick 
and Saul in 1957. He left in 1961 to join the 
Kennedy Administration. 
During the next four year he specialized in the 
Justice Department drive against organized crime in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. He also participated 
in the department's civil rights conciliation effort in 
Mississippi in the summer of 1964, and helped in 
planning the new concept of federal aid to local law 
enforcement agencies. 
From 1965 to 1967 Ruth was deputy director of 
the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and 
the Administration of Justice. In 1967 he joined the 
faculty at the Law School, leaving in 1969 to become 
director of the Justice Department's National Institute 
of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice. 
For the past three years he has headed New York 
Mayor John Lindsay's Criminal Justice Coordinating 
Council. The council's chief function was determining 
how to best utilize federal law enforcement aid. 
Connolly, 32, is a practicing attorney and a partner 
in the Philadelphia firm of Ewing & Cohen, from 
which he has taken a leave of absence. Prior to prac-
ticing in Philadelphia, Connolly served from 1968 to 
1970 as Assistant to the Solicitor General of the 
United States in the Department of Justice, where he 
argued Federal cases before the United States Supreme 
Court. He also served on the Staff of Secretary of 
Defense Robert S. McNamara in 1967, and was Staff 
Attorney to the President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice in 1966. 
Connolly is a native Philadelphian and a graduate 
of the William Penn Charter School and the University 
of Pennsylvania, where he was elected to Phi Beta 
Kappa. He was graduated Magna Cum Laude from 
the Law School and was Note Editor of the Law 
Review. 
Joining Ruth and Connolly will be Carl F. Feld-
baum, '69, a former assistant district attorney in Phila-
delphia and a top aide to District Attorney Arlen 
Specter. 
Feldbaum, 29, will serve as an assistant special 
prosecutor and report directly to Ruth. 
Feldbaum was a student of both Ruth and Specter 
at the Law School in a "Problems in Prosecution" 
seminar which they taught jointly. 
A graduate of Princeton University, Feldbaum con-
ducted the Philadelphia District Attorney's investi-
gation into the Penn Central's operations and the diver-
sion of Penn Central funds to illegal subsidiaries in 
which certain Penn Central officers allegedly had 
interests. 
Feldbaum will work primarily on the internal ad-
ministration of the special group set up to investigate 
the Watergate Break-in, the alleged cover-up by White 
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House aides and other acts of political espionage and 
sabotage during the 1972 Presidential campaign. 
Freedman 
(Continued from page 8) 
in July 1971. He became chairman of the English 
department on July 1, 1973 and will return to full-time 
teaching in the fall. 
Freedman has been a member of the Law School 
faculty since 1964 and has served on the University 
Council and Senate and also as President of the Uni-
versity's chapter of the American Association of Uni-
versity Professors. He specializes in administrative 
law, family law and torts. He is serving this year as 
president of the Mental Health Association of South-
eastern Pennsylvania. 
In announcing Freedman's appointment as ombuds-
man, President Meyerson stated: "The Office of the 
Ombudsman under Joel Conarroe made our institution 
a little more responsive and a little more humane to 
dozens of students, faculty and staff. In Jim Freedman, 
we have a colleague with the sensitivity, wisdom, ex-
perience and respect as both a scholar and teacher to 
carry on the vital mission of this office." 
Dr. Eliot Stellar, Provost of the University, said: 
"The Ombudsman's role is crucial to the welt-being 
of the University community. Professor Freedman 
brings to it a perceptiveness to people combined with 
healthy objectivity and independence. I am looking 
forward to cooperating closely with him." 
Freedman said: "The opportunity to serve the Uni-
versity as its Ombudsman is an exciting one, personally 
and professionally. I hope that I can meet the high 
standards of fairness and good sense that Joel Conar-
roe has set these last two years and that the University 
community is entitled to expect. 
"I also hope that during my tenure the Office of the 
Ombudsman will continue to meet the challenge of 
insuring that the processes by which the University 
makes decisions that affect the lives and careers of its 
individual members-students, faculty, and staff-are 
fair as well as sensitive to human concerns." 
Freedman joined the faculty of the Law School in 
1964 as an assistant professor. He became associate 
professor of law in 1967 and professor of law in 1969. 
He was an associate in the New York law firm of Paul, 
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton and Garrison in 1963-64. 
Following graduation from Yale University Law School 
in 1962, he served for a year as law clerk to Judge 
Thurgood Marshall, who was then a member of the 
U. S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and who 
is now an associate justice of the U. S. Supreme Court. 
Freedman received the bachelor of arts degree cum 
laude from Harvard University in 1957. He has served 
as a consultant to the Administrative Conference of 
the United States since 1968. He was appointed a 
member of the National Panel of Arbitrators of the 
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American Arbitration Association in 1972. Freedman 
served as president of the University's chapter of the 
American Association of University Professors during 
the 1 971-72 academic year. He is the author of a 
number of articles in law reviews on administrative 
law. While serving as ombudsman, he will have a 
reduced teaching load in the Law School. 
The concept of an office of "ombudsman" originated 
in Sweden early in the nineteenth century when the 
first ombudsman was appointed to report incidents of 
administrative malfeasance to the parliament. The 
Ombudsman was given the power to supervise the 
observance of laws in that country and had access to 
official files and documents. He could not reverse de-
cisions nor press charges against those suspected of 
wrongdoing. The real power of his position lay in the 
prestige of the office and in its ability to command 
widespread publicity for its pronouncements, and in its 
unlimited accessibility to any individual with a com-
plaint. Sweden's example was followed by a number 
of other countries-and recently by various American 
universities. 
Jones 
(Continued from page 9) 
Director of the Office of Economic Opportunity-
Office of Legal Services. 
From 1968 to 1970 he was an administrative lawyer 
(appeals and special projects) with the Legal Aid 
Bureau of Chicago. In 1964 and 1965 Mr. Jones 
served as a cooperating attorney for the N.A.A.C.P. 
Educational and Legal Defense Fund, Inc., and the 
Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee in Jack-
son, Mississippi. From 1958 to 1964 he taught 8th 
grade in the Chicago Public School system. 
Mr. Jones serves on the Committee for Public 
Justice, the Committee for Legal Services in Devel-
oping Countries of the International Legal Center; 
the board of directors of several legal services pro-
grams throughout the United States, and as Vice-
Chairman of the National Advisory Committee to the 
Corporation for Public Broadcasting. 
The Dean voiced optimism that "Frank Jones, 
whose track record is one of unbroken successes, will 
be an admirable, creative administrator who will en-
hance legal education at Penn." 
Flanagan 
(Continued from page 40) 
countability must be to the public, for it is the public 
for whose benefit the office was established. The client 
can never be the incumbent, for when a lawyer be-
comes responsible to an incumbent rather than an 
office the stage is set for toadying, favoritism and the 
rule of men and not of law. 
On a recent return trip from Washington, D. C. 
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where the Washington Alumni Club held its annual 
meeting, I commented to Dean Wolfman that the ap-
parent conduct of some of the lawyers in government 
seemed inconsistent with any study in depth of the 
principles of the United States Constitution and its 
foundations in the common law. Their conduct, in-
stead, constituted a rejection of principles of American 
law. The personal standards of these men seemed more 
consistent with procedures grounded in Fascism than 
in the fair play embodied in our standards of due 
process. I asked the Dean what was the status of the 
Law School's approach to the teaching of standards of 
professional conduct and legal ethics. He replied that 
the Law School faculty in the teaching of law does it 
more effectively indirectly by their attitudes of right 
thinking than they could by a direct course on the 
subject. I had to agree with the Dean. Who among us 
experienced courses with Keedy, Reeve, Frey, Chad-
bourne, Schwartz, Hannold or Fordham, to name a few, 
and failed to learn ethical standards of conduct as well 
as the meat of the particular course. 
A mental image of Ned Keedy's bull's eye chalked 
on the board served to emphasize how wide of the 
mark those lawyers had been in their thinking. They 
never would have understood Alex Frey's "wowsin" in 
appreciating the broad picture. And Foster Reeve's 
course in trusts might have instructed them that eternal 
vigilance is the price of safety in handling the affairs 
of clients and selL The mark of each teacher, in his 
own way, was respect for law and obedience to the rule 
of law. The example of their lives was as vital a part 
of the legal education at Penn as was any portion of 
course content. 
Dean Wolfman had no need to cite the continued 
high standard of moral leadership maintained by our 
younger faculty with whom I have had some, but not 
nearly enough, contact. His own and his faculty's 
moral leadership in recent times have been demon-
strated in, for example, their reaction to the youth 
movement in the Law School including recognition of 
the right of students to be heard in faculty councils. 
Extracurricular programs in which alumni have been 
privileged to participate have added to the rounding 
out of current legal education. Recent examples have 
included the debate over preventive detention in which 
then Deputy Attorney General Kleindeinst debated the 
matter with a brilliant and gifted young Harvard law 
professor and the Roberts Lectures which, within the 
last two years; have included Dean Griswold and Judge 
Hastie. And, there have been the alumni sponsored 
student receptions which are now beginning to swing 
into high gear. 
The recent graduates with whom I have come into 
contact are products of an atmosphere at the Law 
School where the standards of American law are lived 
as well as taught. Still there is no room for com-
placency. The striving for excellence must be a con-
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tinuing one. Our physical equipment including class-
rooms, dormitories and library are among the best in 
the country. Our administration and faculty are in the 
continuing high traditions of Penn. As alumni, it is a 
source of pride to observe this excellence in action, but 
it continues to be our privilege and duty to keep things 
that way. 
Alumni Day 
(Continued from page 11) 
'58, '63, '68 and the graduating class. The featured 
luncheon speaker was Assistant Professor Stephen 
Schulhofer. 
Following at 2 P.M. was the seminar on the proposed 
federal rules moderated by Professor A. Leo Levin. 
Participating were Ron. Ruggero J. Aldisert, of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, Ron. 
Alfred L. Luongo of the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Ron. Theodore 
0. Rogers of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court. 
The annual meeting of the Society began at 5 P.M. 
in the foyer of the new building. The report from Presi-
dent Joseph P. Flanagan , Jr. was followed by Dean 
Wolfman's report and the presentation of the Law '33 
Scroll of Immortals by Robert J. Callaghan. 
Thereafter, Norma L. Shapiro made the presentation 
of this year's Distinguished Service Award to Bernard 
G. Segal, '31. 
The election of officers followed the presentation to 
Segal. Nominated and elected were: 
-Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr. '25-President 
-Edwin P. Rome, '40-First Vice President 
-Thomas N. O'Neill, Jr., '53-Second Vice 
President 
-David H. Marion, '63-Secretary 
-Sharon Kaplan Wallis, '67-Treasurer 
Elected to the Board of Managers were Patricia Ann 
Metzer, '66, of Boston, Robert M. Beckman, '56 of 
Washington and Thomas A. O'Boyle, '40 of New 
York City. 
A new feature of the program was an Alumnae 
Coffee Hour on Saturday, May 5th at 10:30 A.M. in 
the Faculty Lounge. 
News Notes 
The Washington, D. C. Law Alumni Club held its 
annual spring meeting at the Army-Navy Club in 
Washington in May. 
The New Jersey Alumni Club held its annual lunch-
eon in conjunction with the New Jersey State Bar 
meetings in Atlantic City on May 19. 
The Law Alumni Society hosted a reception for 
alumni attending the meetings of the American Bar 
Association in August. The reception was held at the 
Washington home of Mr. and Mrs. Morton H. Wilner. 
Summer 1973 
For the past two years the Black Law Students 
Union has provided a free income tax service for the 
black community of Philadelphia. In cooperation with 
Reverend M. Lorenzo Shepard, Jr., Pastor of Mount 
Olivet Tabernacle Baptist Church at 42nd and Wallace 
Streets, the program was able to service more than 200 
people who needed help with their tax problems, but 
who were least able to afford to pay for competent 
service. 
The program was conceived and conducted with 
one of stated goals of the Black Law Students Union 
in mind: developing viable programs that will aid the 
black community. It was felt by the membership that 
many people in the community are victimized by in-
competent overcharging practitioners whose only con-
cern is with the amount of their fee. 
The service was provided on Wednesday evenings 
at the Community Center of Mount Olivet Tabernacle 
Baptist Church. A church was selected as the location 
because it was felt that there, a large number of peo-
ple would be available to take advantage of the 
service. Mount Olivet is centrally located in the black 
community of West Philadelphia. An additional fac-
tor was the attempt of the Black Law Students Union 
to emphasize that this program was designed solely 
to benefit the community and any benefits accruing 
to students was secondary. This in large part con-
tributed to the program's success; for many projects 
in which students participate the emphasis is on stu-
dents picking up skills or practicing without any sub-
stantial benefits accruing to the community that is 
to be served. 
The Black Law Students Union intends to continue 
this program and hopes to develop others that will aid 
the black community of Philadelphia. 
The Daniel Lowenthal Law Student Financial Aid 
Fund has been established in the Law School by the 
family and friends of Daniel Lowenthal. 
This Fund does honor to the memory of Daniel 
Lowenthal, a distinguished lawyer, a graduate of the 
Law School Class of 1931. The Fund symbolizes the 
values of Daniel Lowenthal who believed deeply in 
the law, in its processes, and in legal education. It is 
designed to provide financial aid for worthy law stu-
dents who wish to pursue the law but lack the means 
to do so on their own. 
The Fund shall be invested by the University and 
its income shall, in the discretion of the Dean of the 
Law School, be used to provide scholarship or loan 
support to law students in need. In the Dean's discre-
tion, the principal of the Fund may also be used for 
loans to law students, but only income may be used 
for scholarships. Loans shall be made on such terms 
as to repayment and interest as the Dean, in his dis-
cretion, may deem appropriate in each case. 
This Fund may be augmented by future gifts from 
those wishing to support its purposes and do honor to 
the memory of Daniel Lowenthal. 
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Helena F. Clark 
Noyes Leech 
34 
Faculty And 
Staff Notes 
Placement Director HELENA F. CLARK was 
elected President-elect of the National Association of 
Law Placement at their June conference in Houston, 
Texas. N.A.L.P. was "born" at the University of 
Pennsylvania in August 1971 when 35 law placement 
directors from around the country gathered to discuss 
organizing such an association. The need for national 
communications among law placement directors and 
law recruiters in order to work out their mutual prob-
lems, to discuss the future trends in legal hiring, and 
to do much needed research lead the 35 to enthusias-
tically draw-up a constitution, elect officers and appoint 
a steering committee. The Association has grown to 
130 members, 101 law schools and 29 legal recruiters. 
Ms. Clark was last year's membership chairman and 
on the original steering committee. She had the re-
sponsibility for organizing the workshops given at the 
annual conference last year and this year. 
Ms. Clark came to the Law School in July 1968 
after eight years in placement work with prior experi-
ence in all areas of social work, retailing and dean of 
women's work. She is a University of Delaware gradu-
ate with graduate work in Social Work at the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania and Bryn Mawr College. 
Three new full-time faculty members have been 
appointed, effective July 1, 1973. They are: 
FRANK I. GOODMAN, Visidng Professor of Law 
LAURIE WOHL, Assistant Professor of Law 
MARK SPIEGEL, Assistant Professor of Law 
Professor WOHL is a 1968 cum laude graduate of 
Columbia University Law School. During her second 
and third years she served on the Law Review, and at 
graduation tied with one other for the Jane Marks 
Murphy Prize awarded to the woman student with the 
highest average in the class. After graduation, she 
clerked for Judge Charles M. Metzner on the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, practiced with Debevoise, Plimpton, Lyons and 
Gates in New York City, taught law in Nairobi, and 
now teaches Corporations, Securities Regulation, and 
Welfare Law ~t Northeastern University Law School 
in Boston. 
Professor GOODMAN graduated cum laude from 
Harvard Law School in 1959, having served on the 
Law Review for two years. In 1959-60, he clerked 
for Judge William H. Hastie on the Third Circuit. 
Thereafter, he served as Special Assistant to the Fed-
eral Power Commission's General Counsel, as an 
Assistant Solicitor General, and as a member of the 
Law Faculty at Berkeley. He practiced with the Los 
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Angeles law firm of Beilenson, Meyer, Rosenfeld and 
Sussman. At present, Mr. Goodman is the Director of 
Research of the Administrative Conference of the 
United States. His article, "De Facto School Segrega-
tion: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis," 60 
Calif. L. Rev. 275-437 (1972), has won wide acclaim 
as the best piece of scholarship in its field. Mr. Good-
man's principal teaching interests are in Constitutional 
Law and Torts. 
Assistant Professor of Law SPIEGEL will be con-
cerned principally with the development, coordination 
and direction of clinical legal education. He comes 
with a rich background: Assistant Director of the 
Mandel Clinic at the University of Chicago, a Reginald 
Heber Smith Fellow, and-before that-law school at 
the University of Chicago from which he graduated 
in 1968 with a distinguished academic record. 
New part-time faculty are: 
ALAN J. DAVIS, Advanced Criminal Procedure 
ALEXANDER BROOI):S, Evidence 
LINDA K. LEE, Legislation Course and Seminar 
THOMAS N. O'NEILL, JR., Appellate Advocacy 
DOLORES KORMAN SLOVITER, Civil 
Procedure 
EDMUND B. SPAETH, JR., Evidence 
LOUIS HENKIN, Constitution and Foreign Affairs 
(Seminar) 
Professor JAMES 0. FREEDMAN delivered a paper 
entitled "The Administrative Process and the Elderly" 
at a Symposium on New Approaches to Legal and 
Related Services for Older Persons" held at Syracuse 
University Law School in March. Earlier that month 
he spoke on "The Legal Rights of Children" before the 
Regional Council of Child Psychiatry in Philadelphia. 
Professor Freedman also spoke to the Faculty Tea 
Club on "Emerging Issues in Family Law." 
Professor ALEXANDER M. CAPRON discussed 
"Man's Control Over Man" on February 27, in the 
Virginia Tech's Donaldson Brown Center for Contin-
uing Education auditorium. 
Sponsored by the University's Visiting Scholar Pro-
gram, Capron's public lecture was the last of a three-
part series dealing with "Man's Advances in Medicine 
and Their Implications for Society." 
Capron also addressed an international consultation 
on Genetics and the Quality of Life in Zurich on the 
topic of prenatal diagnosis and abortion and was a 
member of a panel on Death and Dying at the joint 
Mexico City meeting of the American Association for 
Advancement of Science and the Consejo Nacional 
de Ciencia y Technologia-both in June. 
He also testified before Senator Edward Kennedy's 
Subcommittee on Health on "Experimentation in 
Prisons" in March and served on the search committee 
Summer 1973 
Louis B. Schwartz 
Ralph S. Spritzer 
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for a new dean of the University's School of Veterinary 
Medicine. He has also reviewed N. Kittrie's "The 
Right To Be Different" in the April issue of the Co-
lumbia Law Review. 
Professor NOYES LEECH participated in the 23rd 
Annual Forum on Finance in New York City in June. 
The Forum was sponsored by the N.Y.U. Graduate 
School of Business Administration and the Joint Com-
mittee on Education. 
Professor STEPHEN R . GOLDSTEIN has published 
a book commentary, The Unions and the Cities, in 
22 Buffalo L. Rev. 603, concerning collective bargain-
ing by public school teachers and he lectured on School 
Board Policy and the Rights of Individuals to the 26th 
Annual School Boards Conference of the New England 
School Development Council in May. 
Placement Director HELENA F. CLARK spoke to 
hiring partners of law firms across the country on the 
topic "Relationships With Law School Placement 
Offices and Students" at the Conference of American 
Legal Executives in New York City in May. 
She also conducted a workshop for new law place-
ment directors at the Conference of National Associa-
tions of Law Placement in Houston in June. 
ARNOLD J. MILLER has a commentary on the Penn-
sylvania Rules of Civil Procedure titled "Enforcement 
of Judgments in Special Actions" scheduled for publi-
cation by the Lawyers Cooperative as part of the 
Goodrich-Amram series. 
Professor Lours B. SCHWARTZ has completed and 
submitted to the Subcommittee on Criminal Laws and 
Procedures two long memoranda analyzing various 
pending proposals to reform the federal criminal code. 
These proposals include the McClellan Bill, S.1 and 
the Administration Bill, S.1400, introduced by Senator 
Hruska. Both senators were members of the National 
Commission on Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, 
of which Professor Schwartz served as Director. The 
bills derive from the Report of the National Commis-
sion (sometimes referred to as the Brown commission 
from the name of its chairman, former Governor of 
California Edmund G. (Pat) Brown). However, as 
Professor Schwartz's memos reveal, they depart so 
radically from the Brown Commission Code as to 
amount to a virtual rejection of its basic philosophy. 
Professor RALPH S. SPRITZER is currently serving 
as consultant to the Administrative Conference of the 
United States and to the Ford Foundation. In June 
and July he attended the "Summer Economics Institute 
for Law Professors" at the University of Rochester. 
Alumni Notes 
1908 
LEON J. OBERMA YER, of Philadelphia, president 
of the Class of 1904 of Philadelphia's Central High 
School, presided over the class' 69th reunion in June. 
Nine members of the class were in attendance, among 
them ISAAC ASH, '08, and THOMAS HYNDMAN, 
'11. 
1926 
W. JAMES MaciNTOSH, of Philadelphia, has been 
elected a director of Horn and Hardart Baking Com-
pany. Macintosh is a senior partner in the firm of 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius and former chairman of 
Curtis Publishing Co. 
1930 
!SIDOR OSTROFF, of Philadelphia, has been elected 
a vice president of the Consular Law Society of New 
York, the first time an out-of-state officer has been 
elected to . the position. He is an associate member 
dating back to his service as honorary consul for 
of the Philadelphia Consular Corps Association, 
Guatemala. 
SAMUEL E. EWING, of Washington, D. C., has 
retired as vice president, Washington, of RCA 
Corporation. 
1933 
JEROME L. MARKOVITZ, of Philadelphia, reports 
36 
that the class of 193 3 held their 40th reunion at the 
Locust Club on June 9 with 19 members of the class 
in attendance. Professor Alexander Frey, Hon. Israel 
Packel, Pennsylvania Attorney General, and Mrs. 
Packel were the guests of honor. Members of the 
class in attendance were: WILLIAM C. WISE, ED-
WARD FIRST, JOSEPH H. FLANZER, NATHAN 
SILBERSTEIN, FRANCIS J. MORRISSEY, JR., 
DAVID H. ROSENBLUTH, GUSTAVE G . . AM-
STERDAM, B. N. RICHTER, SIDNEY CHAIT, 
JOSEPH M. LEIB, MAX M. BATZER, CHARLES 
FINK, HON. JAMES L. STERN, A. MOORE 
LIFTER, PAUL MALONEY, EDWARD A. KAlER, 
JAMES L. JOHNSON, and EUGENE K. TWINING. 
1936 
G. WILLIAM SHEA, of Los Angeles, Calif., has 
become president of the Los Angeles County Bar 
Association. 
1938 
SYLVAN M. COHEN, of Philadelphia, reports that 
the class of 1938 planned to hold their 35th reunion 
in Puerto Rico over the Memorial Day weekend. 
1939 
CARL HELMETAG, JR., of Philadelphia, became 
general counsel-reorganization of the Penn Central 
Transportation Company on March I. 
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1941 
R. STEWART RAUCH, JR., of Villanova, Pa., 
chairman of the Philadelphia Savings Fund Society, 
has become chairman of the Greater Philadelphia 
Chamber of Commerce. 
OSCAR GOLDBERG, of Denver, Colorado, reports 
that he has settled in that city and plans to be ad-
mitted to the Colorado Bar. 
1943 
MILES K. KIRKPATRICK, of Philadelphia, former 
chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, has be-
come a member of the Philadelphia firm of Morgan, 
Lewis & Bockius. 
1948 
SCOTT W. SCULLY, of Portland, Maine, has been 
appointed general counsel of the Maine Central Rail-
road Company and the Portland Terminal Company. 
WALTER R. SPARKS, JR., of Berwyn, Pa., has 
been elected secretary of the Insurance Company of 
North America. 
1951 
GERALD JONATHAN HAAS, of Philadelphia, has 
been reelected vice president of the Philadelphia 
branch of the United Synagogue of America. 
1952 
HERBERT A. FOGEL, of Philadelphia, has been 
appointed to the bench of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
··-
1953 
PAUL R. DUKE, of Philadelphia, has been ap-
Miles K. Kirkpatrick, '43 
Summer 1973 
Walter R. Sparks, Jr., '48 
pointed general counsel-legal department of the Penn 
Central Transportation Co. 
1955 
VIRGIL B. BALDI, of New York, N.Y., has been 
elected a vice president and director of the New 
York firm of Canny, Bowen, Howard, Peck & 
Associates, Inc. 
IRVING M. HIRSH, of Plainfield, N.J., has been ap-
pointed a judge of the Municipal Court of North 
Plainfield; N. J. 
1959 
GEORGE F. REED, of Houston, Texas, was recently 
elected senior vice president and counsel and a 
member of the board of directors of the American 
General Insurance Company in Houston. 
SAMUEL H. KARSCH, of Philadelphia, has become 
a partner in the Philadelphia firm of Townsend, Elliott 
& Munson. 
1960 
RONALD ZIEGLER, of Philadelphia, has been 
elected Pennsylvania Judge Advocate for the Jewish 
War Veterans of the U.S.A. 
1961 
JACK K. MANDEL, of Anaheim, Cal., has been 
named to the board of directors of the Orange 
County Trial Lawyers Association and to the ad-
visory board of the criminal justice department of the 
California State University at Fullerton. 
JAMES N. HORWOOD, of Reston, Va., has become 
associated with the Washington firm of Spiegel & Me-
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Diarmid. He was formerly deputy assistant general 
counsel to the Postal Rate Commission. 
1962 
FREDERICK J. FRANCIS, of Pittsburgh, Pa., has 
become a partner in the Pittsburgh firm of Meyer, 
Unkovic & Scott. 
1963 
R. ALAN STOTSENBURG, of New York, N. Y., 
writes that he has a private practice as a specialist in 
securities and anti-trust class actions. 
1964 
MICHAEL A. O'PAKE, of Reading, Pa., has become 
associated with the Reading firm of Austin, Speicher, 
Boland, Connor & Giorgi. 
JAMES ROBERT PARISH, of New York, N. Y., 
is co-author of "The George Raft File," to be pub-
lished later this year. 
1965 
LITA INDZEL COHEN, of Merion, Pa., is the first 
woman ever appointed to the Lower Merion Planning 
Commission. 
MARIO A. IA VOCOLI, of Haddonfield, N.J., is 
first assistant prosecutor for Camden County, N.J. 
and is also counsel to the New Jersey "No Fault" 
Commission. He had previously been counsel to the 
Speaker of the New Jersey General Assembly. 
THEODORE A. FLERON, of Baltimore, Md., has 
been elected vice president and secretary of Sun 
Equities, Inc., a broker-dealer subsidiary of Sun Life 
Insurance Company of America. He will continue in 
Peter A. Gross, '69 
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Jonathan Vipond, '70 
his present position as counsel for the company. 
1966 
ARTHUR B. JACOBS, of San Jose, Calif., formed a 
partnership with Charles Wasserman, Jr. and is now 
practicing under the firm name of Wasserman &_ 
Jacobs in San Jose, Calif. 
WILLIAM N. LEVY, of Cherry Hill, N.J., announces 
the removal of the offices of Levy & Levy to One 
Cherry Hill, Suite 706, Cherry Hill, N.J. 
PAUL P . WELSH, of Wilmington, Del., has become a 
member of the Wilmington firm of Morris, Nichols, 
Arsht & Tunnell. Also named as members of the 
firm are WALTER L. PEPPERMAN, II, '67, and 
WILLIAM 0. LaMOTTE, III, '68. 
1967 
DANIEL E. FARMER, of Philadelphia, has been 
named a partner in the Philadelphia firm of MacCoy, 
Evans & Lewis. He previously served as law clerk to 
former Philadelphia Common Pleas Court Judge Ed-
mund B. Spaeth, Jr. and head of the Juvenile Law 
Reform Unit of Community Legal Services of 
Philadelphia. 
STEPHEN SCHOEMAN, of New Rochelle, N.Y., has 
been elected president to Team Emblems, Inc. 
IRA M. GOLDBERG, of Cherry Hill, N.J., is an 
associate professor of law at Rutgers University 
School of Law at Camden, teaching constitutional law 
and conflicts. 
NORMAN PEARLSTINE, of Tokyo, Japan, has been 
named the Wall Street Journal's Tokyo bureau chief. 
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He was previously with the paper's Los Angeles 
bureau. 
1968 
DA VlD I. GRUNFELD, of Philadelphia, has become 
a partner in the Philadelphia firm of Steinberg, Green-
stein, Richman & Price. 
NORMAN B. SKYDELL, of New York, N.Y., has 
become a member of the New York firm of Kass, 
Goodkind, Wechsler & Gerstein. 
N. P. WARDWELL, of Watertown, N.Y., returned 
to this country after a 2Y2 year tour of duty in 
Ethiopia as a judge advocate in the U.S. Army. In 
January, he climbed to Uhuru Peak on top of Mt. 
Kilimanjaro in Tanzania. 
BRUCE JOEL JACOBSOHN, of Philadelphia, has 
been appointed senior assistant regional labor counsel 
for the eastern region of the United States Postal 
Service, covering the mid-Atlantic states and New 
England. 
1969 
NEIL H . COGAN of Dallas, Texas, will become as-
sistant professor at the Southern Methodist University 
School of Law in August. 
DOUGLAS A. ELDRIDGE, of Syracuse, N. Y., has 
been promoted to chief attorney at Onondaga Neigh-
borhood Legal Services, Inc. in Syracuse and elected 
president of the Coalition for Health and Welfare of 
Syracuse and Onondaga County. 
JOHN CRAIG GREEN, of Saigon, Viet Nam, was 
recently made legal advisor to the Defense Attache 
Office, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, after serving a year 
as the special assistant to the Deputy to the 
Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command in 
VietNam. 
PETER A. GROSS, of New York, N.Y., has joined 
TelePrompTer Corporation's legal department as 
corporate counsel. He was formerly associated with 
the New York firm of Dewey, Ballantine, Bushby, 
Palmer & Wood. 1970 
JONATHAN VIPOND, of Waverly, Pa., was elected 
a member of the Pennsylvania House of Representa-
tives in November of last year. 
1971 
KENNETH V. HELAND, of Salisbury, Md. , has be-
come a partner in the Salisbury firm of Richardson, 
Regan, Anderson & Heland. 
ARTHUR W. LEFCO, of Philadelphia, is now gen-
eral counsel of the Philadelphia Housing Authority. 
ROBERT B. LAMM, of New York, N.Y., is asso-
ciated with the New York firm of Wofsey, Certilman, 
Haft, Snow & Becker. As of May, he and his wife 
Carol, CW'68 , were awaiting the birth of their first 
child. 
ROGER E. KOHN, of Hinesburg, Vt., has left Ver-
mont Legal Aid, Inc. to form the partnership of Villa 
& Cohn in Hinesburg, near Burlington. 
1972 
ROBERT M. WALTER, of Bethel Park, Pa., is as-
sociated with the Pittsburgh firm of Reed, Smith, Shaw 
& McClay. 
RICHARD D. BANK, of Dresher, Pa., has become a 
partner in the Norristown/Glenside firm of Bank, 
Shor, Levin & Weiss. 
Necrology 
1903 
BENJAMIN DINTENFASS, Penllyn, Pa . 
1908 
LEIGH M. MORSS, Scranton, Pa., January 1. 
1912 
CLARENCE E. DAVIS, Ebensburg, Pa., January 31 . 
EDMUND H. ROGERS, Philadelphia, January 24. 
1913 
HON. SAMUEL Y. ROSSITER, Erie , Pa. , March 8. 
1914 
WILLIAM N. OTTINGER, Philadelphia, October 11, 1972. 
1915 
JOSEPH N. EWING, Valley Forge, Pa., June 11. 
1916 
WALTER L. RODMAN, Lansdowne, Pa., April 23. 
JACOB H. SHERRARD, Brownsville , Pa., May 16. 
THOMAS E. SHIPLEY, Philadelphia, June 14. 
HERBERT P. SUNDHEIM, Philadelphia, April 18. 
1917 
WAYNE H. IRVINE, Philadelphia. 
MORTON WITKIN, Philadelphia, April 20. 
1920 
WALTER S. HARE, Allentown, Pa ., April 23. 
1921 
A. SAMUEL BUCHMAN, Philadelphia, March 2. 
1922 
J. H. WARD HINKSON, Wallingford , Pa., June 1. 
1924 
FRANKLIN G. BANKS, Philadelphia, March 6. 
SIDNEY KAPLAN, Merchantville, N.J. , May 5. 
Summer 1973 
1928 
HON. RALPH C. BODY, oyertown, Pa ., June 2. 
1929 
SIMON MUSTOKOFF, Philadelphia, March 1. 
1931 
WALTER J. BROBYN, Philadelphia, June 24. 
JOHN M. DUDRICK, Nanticoke, Pa., January 5. 
DUDLEY T. EASBY, JR., Philadelphia, March 16. 
1933 
JOHN J. GAIN , Philadelphia, June 4. 
1935 
H. PARR JOHNSON, Mclean, Va. , March 11. 
1937 
IVAN M. CZAP, Philadelphia , February 10. 
1938 
ANTONIO ELLENI, Arlington, Va., September 12, 1972. 
1941 
JOHN V. BOLAND, Reading , Pa., August 16, 1969. 
1949 
JACKSON W. RAYSOR, Milford, Del., April 21. 
CASPAR W. B. TOWNSEND, JR., April 23. 
1951 
JOHN C. CLEMENS, Reading , Pa. , January 13. 
ALVIN DIAMOND, Willow Grove, Pa. , April 9. 
RICHARD H. TALLANT, Wilmington , Del., April 12. 
1956 
PAUL A. LEVY, Philadelphia, May 6. 
1972 
THOMAS M. WRIGHT, Reading , Pa., March 13. 
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Alumni Society 
President's Message 
By Joseph P. Flanagan, Jr. 
The American version of Greek Tragedy that 
opened this summer involved a conspicuously large 
number of lawyers. Most of them were ably prac-
ticing their profession in the representation of the 
various parties before the Senate Committee-counsel 
for the Committee itself and lawyers for the majority 
and minority members and of witnesses before the 
Committee. A minority of lawyers who appeared on 
the scene were there as actors in the drama-lawyers 
called to account for their actions or advice or lack of 
it in their capacity as counsel for government officials. 
These were lawyers who have been caught in the sweep 
of a movement so powerful that they became a part of 
it, flowed along helplessly with it and, when it sub-
sided, were left stranded. . 
The drama would never have been played if the 
lawyers involved had maintained their independence as 
a prime obligation. These men were learned in the law, 
of greater than ordinary brightness, and clearly capable 
of the highest and most intense devotion to a cause. 
Their mistake was one of identity - who was their 
client? 
The client, for lawyers in government, must be the 
office or body for which they are counsel. Their ac-
(Continued on page 32) 
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